Daniels v. Alameda County

Background

Paul S. Daniels and Nanette Dillard alleged that they were prosecuted by the Alameda County District Attorney’s Office in retaliation for exercising their First Amendment rights. They asserted federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a civil-rights statute, for malicious prosecution and retaliatory prosecution. The court had previously dismissed those claims because the plaintiffs had not plausibly alleged that each defendant caused their prosecutions or that the prosecutions lacked probable cause.

After the plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint, the defendants again moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint adequately states a legal claim. The defendants also moved to strike the state-law claims under California’s anti-SLAPP statute. The court held that the threshold issue was whether the amended complaint cured the defects identified in the earlier order and stated that it did not need to reach the defendants’ other arguments.

Why the Court Dismissed the Federal Claims

The court explained that a § 1983 malicious-prosecution claim requires allegations that criminal proceedings were brought maliciously, without probable cause, and to deny a specific constitutional right. A retaliatory-prosecution claim requires a retaliatory motive by an official urging prosecution and an absence of probable cause.

The court found that the amended complaint did not plausibly allege that any particular defendant—including Alameda County, the Alameda County Auditor-Controller Agency, the Alameda County Board of Supervisors, Nate Miley, Scott Haggerty, and Patrick O’Connell—engaged in wrongful or bad-faith conduct that was instrumental in causing the criminal proceedings. The allegations about political pressure by Miley and Haggerty were conclusory. The allegation that an unnamed County representative threatened Dillard did not plausibly show that the County or Board of Supervisors caused the charges. The allegations concerning the Auditor-Controller Agency and O’Connell involved an allegedly fraudulent accounting but did not connect those actions to the prosecution.

The court also held that the plaintiffs had not adequately alleged an absence of probable cause. Under the California law the court applied, convictions generally conclusively establish probable cause unless obtained through fraud, perjury, or other corrupt means. The plaintiffs’ convictions on some counts therefore established probable cause, and their allegations that defendants mishandled federal grant funds did not plausibly show that the convictions were obtained through fraud.

For the counts on which the plaintiffs were acquitted, the court treated a preliminary-hearing finding of probable cause as prima facie evidence that could be rebutted with facts showing fraud, corruption, perjury, fabricated evidence, or other bad-faith conduct. The court found the allegations insufficient. It found no plausible connection between an alleged false accusation about a computer and one charge involving the availability of funds, and no plausible showing that an allegedly altered receipt materially caused the charge involving Dillard’s reimbursement and work performed at her residence.

Disposition

The court dismissed the § 1983 claim without leave to amend because the plaintiffs had already been given an opportunity to amend and still had not alleged facts tying each defendant’s conduct to the initiation of specific criminal charges. The court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the § 1983 claim without leave to amend. It dismissed the state-law claims without prejudice. The order disposed of Docket No. 54.