Robinson v. Doetsch

Background

Rusley Robinson, Jr., identified in the opinion as a California state prisoner proceeding without a lawyer, brought a civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Tara Doetwch of the Board of Parole Hearings. The court had previously concluded that, reading Robinson’s amended complaint broadly, it stated a claim for injunctive relief in the form of an earlier parole suitability hearing under Wilkinson v. Dotson.

Robinson alleged that he consulted with Commissioner Michele Minor on January 9, 2015. According to his allegations, Minor told him to enter into or perform various vocational, work, rehabilitation, educational, behavioral, and parole-plan requirements. Robinson said he refused to be subjected to those requirements. He later sent documents to the Board of Parole Hearings, and he alleged that he received “negative results” from Doetwch on March 2, 2018. Robinson sought an earlier parole hearing, transfer or release to a third party, and an injunction against Doetwch.

Motion and analysis

Robinson moved for summary judgment, which is a request for judgment without a trial because the evidence supposedly shows that no important fact is genuinely disputed. He sought a permanent injunction preventing Doetwch from filing documents that purported to create a decision or order against him. Alternatively, he requested a schedule for pretrial proceedings and trial.

The court explained that the party seeking summary judgment must identify evidence showing that no genuine dispute exists over any important fact. When that party bears the burden of proof, it must show that no reasonable factfinder could decide for the opposing party. The opposing party must then identify specific evidence creating a genuine issue for trial.

The court found that Robinson did not satisfy his initial burden under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c). He stated no material facts and submitted no evidence with his motion. The court noted that appropriate supporting materials could include documents, depositions, admissions, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations based on personal knowledge, stipulations, interrogatories, or other admissible materials. Robinson provided none of these and relied on the allegations in his amended complaint.

The court also stated that Robinson’s assertions that he was a third-party intervenor in a “dispute of title,” held the title of a secured-party creditor, owned two Yolo County Superior Court cases as “trust res,” and was a private citizen under the Fourteenth Amendment were not relevant to the due-process claim at issue.

Disposition

The court held that Robinson had not shown that no genuine dispute of material fact existed and was therefore not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. It denied Robinson’s motion for summary judgment, terminated Docket No. 21, and stated that Doetwch’s separate motion for summary judgment, Docket No. 51, would be decided in a separate order after it was fully briefed. The opinion is signed by United States District Judge Edward J. Davila.