Wister v. White
- William Orrick
- 3:19-cv-05882
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 6
In Wister v. White, Judge Orrick granted IFP, dismissed the complaint with prejudice after screening, and denied defendants’ motion to dismiss as moot.
Robert B. Wister’s claims against Donald R. White, the Office of County Counsel, and all other defendants were dismissed; the defendants’ motion to dismiss was denied as moot.
What happened
Robert B. Wister, representing himself, filed a pleading called an appeal from a California Supreme Court decision. The dispute arose after the Alameda County Treasurer’s Office lost a check Wister sent for property taxes, and a California state court dismissed his related claims.
The federal court treated the filing either as an attempted appeal or as a new complaint. It said federal district courts cannot review state-court judgments in this way, and that Wister’s federal and state claims also had legal defects, including that several statutes did not create a private right to sue.
Judge William H. Orrick granted Wister permission to proceed without paying the filing fee, dismissed the complaint with prejudice and without leave to amend, and denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss as moot.
The detailed version
- Wister v. White · No. 3:19-cv-05882
- William Orrick
- Dec. 16, 2019
Background
Robert B. Wister, proceeding without a lawyer, filed a pleading titled “Appeal From Decision of California Supreme Court.” The court construed the pleading as a complaint for initial review. Wister also applied to proceed without paying the filing fee, which the court granted.
The dispute began after Wister sent the Alameda County Treasurer’s Office a $440.62 check for a property-tax installment in December 2015. The Treasurer’s Office told him the check had been lost. Wister stopped payment, incurred a $13 charge, and sent a replacement check for $427.62. The Treasurer’s Office returned that check. Wister later sent another $440.62 check and the returned $427.62 check. The Treasurer’s Office applied the $440.62 check to the earlier installment and returned the other check, while demanding payment of the later installment and penalties.
Wister sought a court order requiring the Treasurer’s Office to accept his partial payment. A California trial court sustained the government’s objections to his first two petitions, gave him permission to amend, and later dismissed the claims after he did not correct the identified deficiencies. A California appellate court affirmed that dismissal. In federal court, Wister appeared to challenge that state-court result and to assert claims against Donald R. White, the Alameda County Tax Collector, and the Office of County Counsel.
Claims and legal standards
Wister appeared to assert claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Elder Abuse and Extortion Act, and the Elder Justice Act of 2009. He also cited California Government Code sections 6200 and 6203 and sought exemplary damages.
Because the court granted permission to proceed without paying the filing fee, it was required to screen the complaint. Screening required dismissal of claims that were frivolous, failed to state a claim, or sought money from an immune defendant. The court also applied the more forgiving interpretation ordinarily given to a complaint filed by a person without a lawyer.
Court’s analysis
The court said the filing could not proceed under either possible interpretation. If it was an appeal seeking to overturn the California appellate judgment, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred the action. That doctrine prevents a federal district court from functioning as an appeals court for a state-court judgment.
If the filing was treated as a new complaint, the court found it frivolous and legally insufficient. The court held that the Elder Abuse and Extortion Act and the Elder Justice Act of 2009 did not create a private right of action, meaning that those statutes did not allow Wister to bring his own lawsuit under them. It also held that California Government Code sections 6200 and 6203 are criminal statutes that do not create a private right of action.
The court further held that claim preclusion, also called res judicata, barred Wister’s § 1983 claim and his other claims because they arose from the same facts and could have been raised in the earlier state-court proceedings. The court additionally held that the claims against the Alameda County Counsel were barred by absolute immunity because the attorneys were performing acts closely connected to their role representing the government in litigation.
Although complaints filed by people without lawyers are often allowed to be amended, the court concluded that claim preclusion barred every claim and that amendment could not produce a plausible cause of action in that court based on the alleged facts.
Disposition
The court dismissed the complaint with prejudice under the screening statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), and stated in its conclusion that Wister’s claims against all defendants were dismissed without leave to amend. It denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss as moot, vacated all hearings, and ordered judgment entered. The opinion contains both the phrase “with prejudice” and the conclusion that the claims were dismissed “without leave to amend.”
Read the full 6-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.