Alderman v. City of Cotati

Background

Laurie Elizabeth Alderman sued the City of Cotati and several city officials. The complaint asserted a free-speech claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a claim that the City was responsible for a constitutional violation under the rule commonly called Monell liability, and a claim under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).

Alderman alleged that city officials and other speakers criticized and embarrassed her after she spoke at city council meetings and raised concerns about her neighbor’s property and other city issues. She also alleged that officials limited speaking time, removed her from a meeting after she continued speaking past the time limit, threatened her with arrest, made disparaging comments about her in person and online, and failed to stop some councilmembers from speaking against her. She further alleged that the City knew about her spinal cord condition and post-traumatic stress disorder and that stress worsened her condition.

Motion to Strike

The defendants asked the court to strike allegations concerning events occurring before September 19, 2017, arguing that those events would be barred by the statute of limitations. Alderman responded that she offered the earlier events as background rather than as separate claims.

The court denied the motion to strike allegations in paragraphs 8–58 and 70. It concluded that the earlier events could explain the alleged conduct toward Alderman and therefore were not redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous. The court did not decide that the earlier events were actionable; it stated that they might not support claims because of the statute of limitations.

Free-Speech Claim

To plead retaliation for protected speech, Alderman had to allege protected activity, an adverse action that would discourage an ordinarily firm person from continuing that activity, and a substantial connection between the speech and the adverse action.

The court held that public insults, attacks on reputation, and the release of information were not enough by themselves to establish a constitutional violation. It explained that reputational harm generally must be accompanied by an effect on a more tangible interest, such as employment, benefits, rights, or status with the government. The court also considered Alderman’s allegation that a councilmember threatened to have her arrested, but noted that she alleged the threat followed her continuing to speak after her allotted time. On the allegations presented, the threat appeared to enforce the speaking-time limit rather than retaliate against her speech.

The court granted the motion to dismiss the free-speech claim. It expressly stated that this dismissal was without prejudice because it was not clear that Alderman could not allege sufficient additional facts. Any amendment would need to allege more than reputational harm, such as an affected tangible interest or a threat of arrest or other legal action connected to protected speech.

Because the free-speech claim was dismissed, the court also concluded that the related Monell claim against the City failed and had to be dismissed. The court did not address the defendants’ arguments about qualified immunity or exemplary damages because those arguments applied only to the constitutional claim.

ADA Claim

The court dismissed Alderman’s ADA claim because she brought it under Title III. Title III applies to private entities that operate places of public accommodation, while Title II applies to public entities such as a city. The court therefore explained that a claim against the City should have been brought under Title II.

The court also found that the complaint did not clearly allege a Title II violation. A Title II claim requires allegations that the plaintiff has a disability, is otherwise qualified to participate in or receive a public entity’s services or benefits, was excluded from or denied those services or benefits or otherwise discriminated against, and suffered that treatment because of the disability. Although the court recognized that Alderman identified a spinal cord condition and post-traumatic stress disorder, it found it unclear what barrier prevented her from participating in city council meetings. The court also noted that her allegations suggested she had not been prevented or excluded from speaking or participating.

The court further stated that facts about meetings continuing past 10:00 p.m. appeared in Alderman’s opposition but not in the complaint, and it was unclear whether meeting times alone could establish a Title II claim.

Disposition

The court granted in part and denied in part the defendants’ motion. It denied the motion to strike paragraphs 8–58 and 70. It granted the motion to dismiss Alderman’s claims, including the free-speech, Monell, and ADA claims. The court expressly described the free-speech dismissal as without prejudice and allowed Alderman to file an amended complaint consistent with the order by February 28, 2020. The order did not separately state whether the Monell or ADA dismissals were with or without prejudice. Judge Kandis Westmore issued the order without oral argument.