Court, Explained
U.S. Federal District Courts
Back to docket
N.D. Cal.Procedural orderFiled Mar. 30, 2021

Barich v. Cotati

Judge
Edward Chen
Docket
3:21-cv-00034
Court
U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
Pages
4
First AmendmentSection 1983ADA / DisabilityMotion to Dismiss
In one sentence

In Barich v. Cotati, Judge Chen granted defendants’ motion to dismiss constitutional and disability claims, allowing amendment.

Who this affects

George E. Barich and Laurie Alderman may amend their complaint within 30 days; the City of Cotati and John A. Dell’Osso obtained dismissal of the complaint at this stage.

What happened

In Barich v. Cotati, George Barich and Laurie Alderman challenged the mayor’s refusal to let Alderman read Barich’s written statement during public comments at two City Council meetings.

They claimed the refusal violated the First Amendment and equal-protection guarantees, and that the City was responsible for an unconstitutional policy or practice. They also brought a disability-discrimination claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act. The court found the constitutional allegations too general and concluded the disability claim did not establish a claim that could be remedied in court. The court did not decide the defendants’ qualified-immunity defense.

Judge Edward M. Chen granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, but allowed the plaintiffs 30 days to amend their complaint.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
Barich v. Cotati · No. 3:21-cv-00034
Judge
Edward Chen
Date
Mar. 30, 2021

Background

The City of Cotati and John A. Dell’Osso, identified as the City’s mayor during the relevant period, moved to dismiss George E. Barich and Laurie Alderman’s complaint. The dispute concerned Dell’Osso’s decision not to allow Alderman to read a written statement from Barich into the record during the public-comment period at two City Council meetings in 2019.

Constitutional Claims

The plaintiffs alleged that the decision was based on the content and source of the statement and was intended to deprive Alderman of her constitutional rights. They asserted First Amendment viewpoint-discrimination and equal-protection claims.

The court held that the complaint did not identify specific instances in which Dell’Osso or his predecessors had allowed a similarly situated person to read a written statement during a City Council meeting. The court found that the allegation that this happened “routinely” was a conclusion rather than a specific factual allegation. Without more detailed allegations of unequal treatment, the plaintiffs failed to state claims for First Amendment viewpoint discrimination or unequal treatment under the Equal Protection Clause.

Municipal Liability Claim

The plaintiffs also asserted a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City under the rule commonly called Monell. That rule can make a local government liable for an unconstitutional policy, custom, or practice.

Because the plaintiffs had not adequately alleged a constitutional violation, the court concluded that the Monell claim also failed. The court additionally found that the complaint did not adequately allege a City policy or custom of violating First Amendment or equal-protection rights, or facts showing that Dell’Osso was the City’s final policymaker.

Qualified Immunity

The court expressly did not reach the merits of the defendants’ qualified-immunity defense. It noted that qualified immunity ordinarily is not available for a sufficiently pleaded claim involving intentional discrimination that would clearly violate the Constitution. The court also noted that a different claim concerning the reasonableness of the City Council’s time, place, and manner restrictions on speech might raise a qualified-immunity issue.

Americans with Disabilities Act Claim

The plaintiffs brought a claim under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act and sought punitive damages, injunctive relief, and compensatory damages. The court concluded that the plaintiffs had not stated a redressable claim and therefore had not established standing under Article III of the Constitution.

The court explained that punitive damages are unavailable under Title II. It also found that the plaintiffs had not alleged an imminent threat of repeated future harm sufficient to support injunctive relief. For compensatory damages, the plaintiffs needed to allege that the City acted with deliberate indifference. The court found that the complaint’s assertion that the City intentionally disregarded Barich’s disability was conclusory and unsupported by facts. It further stated that the failure of hearing-aid devices provided to Barich did not appear to be an intentional act designed to exclude him from participating.

Disposition

The court granted the City’s motion to dismiss, with leave to amend within 30 days from the date of the court’s ruling at the hearing. The order disposed of Docket No. 9.

The authoritative version

Read the full 4-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

Open opinion PDF →
Summary written with AI assistance. See how summaries are made. Spot something wrong? Tell us.