Hopton v. Saul

Background

Timothy Hopton sought Title II and Title XVI Social Security disability benefits. He alleged that he became unable to work on December 21, 2013 because of mental impairments, including obsessive-compulsive disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, panic disorder, major depressive disorder, and insomnia disorder. An administrative law judge found that Hopton had severe mental impairments but retained the ability to perform limited medium work. The administrative law judge concluded that Hopton could not perform his past work but could perform jobs such as dishwasher and cleaner II, and therefore denied benefits.

Hopton asked the district court to overturn that decision. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, which ask the court to decide the case based on the administrative record and applicable law without a trial.

Medical opinions and symptom testimony

The court held that the administrative law judge did not provide legally sufficient reasons for discounting the opinions of examining psychologist Dr. John Kiefer and treating psychologist Dr. Judith Speed. The administrative law judge described Dr. Kiefer’s opinions as inconsistent with the evidence without explaining which evidence conflicted with which findings. The administrative law judge also discounted Dr. Kiefer’s later opinion because it differed from Dr. Speed’s opinion and because Hopton had worked part time at the Thrive Café. The court found those reasons insufficient because the two psychologists largely agreed about Hopton’s limitations, and the café program allowed a peer mentor, flexible breaks, and other support not ordinarily available in regular employment.

The court also found that the administrative law judge improperly discounted Dr. Speed’s opinion based on activities such as making hats, researching medication, reading, applying for MediCal, and participating in the café rehabilitation program. The court concluded that these activities did not show that Hopton could sustain regular competitive employment. The administrative law judge also relied on the relatively short period of treatment without addressing the other relevant factors for evaluating a treating psychologist’s opinion and did not specifically address Dr. Speed’s assessment that Hopton had a substantial loss of ability in certain basic work activities.

The court separately held that the administrative law judge failed to provide specific, clear, and convincing reasons for rejecting Hopton’s testimony about his symptoms and functional limitations. The court found that the administrative law judge’s reliance on Hopton’s daily activities, his occasional success with tasks, and his medication concerns did not meet that standard. The court also identified an inconsistency in the decision: the administrative law judge found that Hopton had severe obsessive-compulsive disorder but appeared to discount Hopton’s reports of that disorder as not incapacitating.

Remand for benefits

The court did not reach Hopton’s additional arguments about the residual functional capacity finding or the administrative law judge’s step-three and step-five findings because the errors in evaluating the medical evidence and symptom testimony were enough to require setting aside the decision. The court determined that the errors were not harmless.

The court applied the credit-as-true rule, which can allow an immediate benefits award when the record is fully developed, the agency failed to give legally sufficient reasons for rejecting evidence, and crediting that evidence would require a finding of disability. The court found all three requirements satisfied. It stated that the record was fully developed, that the medical opinions and Hopton’s testimony had been improperly discounted, and that the vocational expert testified that a person needing frequent supervision or being off task 15 percent of the workday would not be employable in the identified unskilled jobs.

Disposition

Judge Jacquelyn Scott Corley granted Hopton’s motion for summary judgment, denied the Commissioner’s cross-motion, vacated the administrative law judge’s final decision, and remanded for an award of benefits.