Jones v. Jinparn

Background

Al D. Jones and John W. Jones sued several people and entities concerning the handling of their deceased brother Harleem Sweets’s remains. The plaintiffs alleged that, after John requested a welfare check, Officer Adam Jinparn went to Harleem’s apartment, found him dead, and contacted others involved in identifying and handling the body. According to the amended complaint, a person named Bobbie McFadden falsely claimed to be Harleem’s sister, and the body was released to a funeral home and then transferred for cremation. The plaintiffs alleged that Jinparn did not try to contact them or take additional steps to verify McFadden’s claim.

The plaintiffs originally filed the case in Contra Costa County Superior Court. Jinparn removed it to federal court based on federal-question jurisdiction. After the court dismissed the original complaint, the plaintiffs filed a first amended complaint. That complaint asserted claims against Jinparn for alleged deprivation of personal privacy in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and for “common counts.” The court construed the constitutional claims as claims under the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs were representing themselves.

Reasons for the ruling

A motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests whether a complaint states a legally sufficient claim. The court accepted factual allegations as true and read the plaintiffs’ filings liberally, but it explained that conclusory statements and bare recitations of legal elements are not enough.

For the substantive due process claim, the court recognized that family members may have a protected interest in directing and controlling the disposition of a deceased relative’s body. But the court held that the alleged conduct did not “shock the conscience” or offend basic standards of fairness. It characterized the allegations as showing, at most, a failure to use reasonable care. The court explained that an official’s negligent act, without an abuse of governmental power, does not violate substantive due process.

For the equal protection claim, the court held that the amended complaint did not plausibly allege intentional discrimination. The plaintiffs alleged that Jinparn assumed Harleem was Muslim and failed to verify McFadden’s relationship, and they described the procedures for verifying heirs as discriminatory toward Black people. The court found those allegations conclusory and unsupported by facts showing that Jinparn acted because of a protected characteristic or treated similarly situated people differently.

The court also rejected the common-count claim. It explained that a common count is a simplified pleading for a monetary debt and generally requires allegations of a specific sum owed, the basis for the debt, and nonpayment. The amended complaint did not allege that Jinparn owed the plaintiffs a monetary debt. The court further stated that the plaintiffs abandoned this claim by failing to address it in their opposition to the motion.

Disposition

Judge Saundra Armstrong granted Officer Jinparn’s motion to dismiss. The court dismissed the First and Third Causes of Action without leave to amend because the plaintiffs had already received an opportunity to correct the pleading’s defects but added no materially different facts. The court dismissed Adam Jinparn from the action with prejudice. Because the claims remaining in the case arose under California law, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over them and remanded the remaining claims to Contra Costa County Superior Court. The Clerk was directed to close the file and terminate pending matters.