Woods v. City of Hayward

Background

Bobbie Allen Woods, representing himself, sued the City of Hayward, the Hayward Police Department, Hayward Police Officer B. Tong, and Hayward Police Sergeant Polar. His claims arose from a police search of his home conducted under a warrant. Woods alleged that officers ordered the residents out, pointed rifles at him as he left in his wheelchair, directed him to remain outside in light clothing, and provided a yellow body tarp bag after about half an hour. He also alleged that officers knew about his muscular dystrophy and that cold temperatures worsened his condition.

The first amended complaint asserted claims for unreasonable seizure and unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, failure to provide a reasonable accommodation under the Americans with Disabilities Act, negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and invasion of privacy. Woods no longer asserted an equal-protection claim or an Americans with Disabilities Act claim against the individual defendants.

Claims Against the Hayward Police Department

Defendants argued that the Police Department should be dismissed because it was redundant of the City. The court declined to dismiss the Department on that basis because the record did not establish as a matter of law that it was merely an agency of the City, and it was unclear whether dismissal would have any practical effect. The court encouraged the parties to discuss a possible stipulation.

Section 1983 Claims Against the City and Police Department

For a municipality to be liable under § 1983, a plaintiff generally must show that a constitutional violation resulted from a municipal policy, custom, practice, ratification, or inadequate training. Woods relied only on ratification, arguing that the City’s denial of his government claim approved the officers’ conduct. The court held that merely denying a claim for compensation was not enough to establish ratification or municipal liability.

The court therefore dismissed Woods’s § 1983 claims against the City of Hayward and the Hayward Police Department without further leave to amend at that time. The dismissal was without prejudice to Woods filing a motion for leave to reassert those claims later if he became aware of facts supporting a qualifying policy, practice, or ratification.

Unreasonable Search Claim Against the Individual Defendants

Because the search was conducted under a warrant, the court held that Tong and Polar were entitled to qualified immunity to the extent the search’s scope was consistent with the warrant. The court reviewed the warrant, which listed Woods’s address among the places to be searched and did not restrict the areas within the house that could be searched. The court concluded that the search was conducted under a facially valid warrant and granted the motion as to the unreasonable-search claim. That claim was dismissed with prejudice.

The court noted that Woods’s separate argument about the force used during the search still lacked sufficient factual support, and the order did not decide whether the alleged force was unreasonable.

Unreasonable Seizure Claim Against the Individual Defendants

The court found that Woods had added enough allegations to plausibly claim that he was seized. The allegations that officers ordered him to leave, directed him to park his wheelchair at a particular location, and guarded him with visible firearms supported an inference that a reasonable person would not have felt free to leave.

Although officers generally may detain occupants while executing a search warrant, the court explained that a detention may become unreasonable when it is unnecessarily painful, degrading, prolonged, or especially burdensome for an elderly or disabled person. Taking Woods’s allegations as true at the dismissal stage, the court found no apparent justification for keeping him outside in light clothing for about half an hour rather than obtaining clothing or allowing him to wait inside. The court denied the motion to dismiss this claim against Tong and Polar.

Americans with Disabilities Act Claim

The court denied defendants’ request to dismiss Woods’s disability-accommodation claim against the City and the Hayward Police Department. The court had previously allowed substantially identical allegations to proceed, and defendants had not properly sought reconsideration of that ruling.

The court also held that whether defendants deliberately disregarded Woods’s disability was a factual issue that could not be resolved on the pleadings. Woods plausibly alleged that defendants knew of his disability, that he was not suspected of wrongdoing, that he explained cold temperatures worsened his muscular dystrophy, and that officers refused his request to wait indoors without providing an adequate alternative.

State-Law Claims

The court rejected defendants’ argument that the negligence, emotional-distress, and invasion-of-privacy claims depended on the federal search and seizure claims. Defendants had not provided sufficient authority or explanation for dismissing the state-law claims on that basis. The court also held that Woods’s claims against the City and Police Department were not defective merely because the amended complaint did not cite particular California statutes or use the words “vicarious liability.”

The court held that Woods sufficiently connected Tong and Polar to the alleged conduct because they allegedly supervised the operation. It denied the motion to dismiss the negligence claim, concluding that Woods had plausibly alleged a duty of care and a breach based on his detention outside in the cold despite the alleged knowledge of his disability.

The court dismissed the intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim with leave to amend because Woods had not alleged that defendants intended to cause him severe emotional distress or actually knew that such distress would result. The court did not decide whether the alleged conduct was extreme and outrageous or whether Woods’s distress was sufficiently severe.

The court held that a valid search warrant completely defeated Woods’s invasion-of-privacy claim as presented and dismissed that claim with prejudice.

Disposition

Judge Joseph C. Spero granted defendants’ motion in part and denied it in part. The motion was granted as to the unreasonable-search and invasion-of-privacy claims, which were dismissed with prejudice; the § 1983 unreasonable-seizure claims against the City and Police Department, which were dismissed without further leave to amend at that time but without prejudice to a later motion for leave to reassert them; and the intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim, which was dismissed with leave to amend. The motion was denied as to the unreasonable-seizure claim against Tong and Polar, the Americans with Disabilities Act claim, and the negligence claim. Woods was permitted to file a third amended complaint addressing the emotional-distress claim by April 3, 2020.