Keelen v. Commissioner of Social Security

Background

Mario Keelen sought judicial review of the Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of his application for supplemental security income. He alleged mental-health conditions, substance-use problems, back and knee problems, and related limitations. After two administrative hearings, an administrative law judge (ALJ) found that Keelen would be disabled when considering all of his impairments, but also found that his alcohol-use disorder was a contributing factor material to the disability determination. The ALJ therefore concluded that Keelen was not disabled under the Social Security Act because he would not be disabled if he stopped using substances.

Keelen moved for summary judgment, meaning he asked the court to rule in his favor based on the administrative record. The Commissioner filed a cross-motion for summary judgment.

Court’s Analysis

The court held that the ALJ erred in finding that Keelen’s alcohol use was material to the disability determination. The ALJ relied partly on Keelen’s improved functioning in structured settings, including a residential recovery program and custody. The court explained that improvement in such settings might result from the structure or treatment, rather than from sobriety alone. The record and the ALJ’s analysis did not separate those possible causes.

The court also found that treatment records cited by the ALJ did not adequately support a finding of significant improvement during periods of reduced alcohol use. Although some records showed improvement, they also documented continuing anxiety, depression, paranoia, and post-traumatic-stress symptoms. The court therefore held that substantial evidence did not support the ALJ’s materiality finding.

The court further held that the ALJ improperly weighed the medical opinions. The ALJ gave the most weight to the testimony of a non-examining medical expert and little weight to the opinion of treating psychologist Ted Aames. Because Aames’s opinion was contradicted, the ALJ needed to give specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence for discounting it. The court found that the ALJ’s explanation for favoring the medical expert was conclusory and that the reasons for discounting Aames’s opinion relied on evidence that did not establish significant improvement during reduced alcohol use or in structured settings.

Because the ALJ’s assessment of the medical opinions affected the mental portion of Keelen’s residual functional capacity—the most he could still do despite his impairments—the court also remanded on the ALJ’s failure to consider all relevant evidence in determining that capacity.

The court rejected Keelen’s argument that the ALJ had to keep the administrative record open for additional statements from treating providers. The court found that the evidence was not ambiguous or inadequate for evaluating the claim and that Keelen had not identified legal authority requiring the ALJ to keep the record open.

Finally, the court held that the ALJ improperly rejected Keelen’s testimony about the severity of his symptoms. The ALJ did not first determine whether objective medical evidence showed an impairment that could reasonably produce the alleged symptoms. The ALJ also stated, without citing supporting evidence, that Keelen’s paranoia without alcohol use appeared to be a normal reaction to his circumstances. The court found that this was not an adequate reason to reject the testimony.

Disposition

Judge Laurel Beeler granted in part Keelen’s motion for summary judgment, denied the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment, and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with the order. The court chose further proceedings rather than directing an immediate award of benefits. The remand requires reconsideration of the alcohol-use materiality issue, the medical opinions, the related residual-functional-capacity analysis, and Keelen’s testimony. The court did not remand based on the argument that the ALJ failed to keep the record open.