Lopez v. Holler

Background

Edward Lopez, an inmate at Pelican Bay State Prison, brought a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal law allowing claims against state officials for constitutional violations. He alleged that prison officials violated his procedural due-process rights by denying him an electric beard trimmer for 14 months.

In September 2017, Lopez ordered an electric trimmer. When he tried to receive it, defendant C. Holler told him that the trimmers were not allowed and that the item had been returned to the vendor. Pelican Bay had disallowed electric hair trimmers while seeking approval for that restriction from the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. Lopez challenged the decision through the prison grievance process.

The first-level grievance was partially granted because Lopez received an explanation for the denial, although the request to allow him to purchase the trimmer was not granted. The second-level review also did not allow the purchase. At the third level, the reviewer directed Pelican Bay to follow the department’s authorized-property schedule, which allowed inmates to possess electric hair trimmers and stated that Pelican Bay could not enforce its requested exemption before receiving approval. Pelican Bay later revised its policy to allow hair trimmers, and Lopez obtained one in December 2018.

Legal standard

The court applied the summary-judgment standard under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence shows that there is no genuine dispute over a fact that could affect the outcome and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Due-process claim

The court said it was unclear whether Lopez had a protected property interest in possessing the trimmer. Protected property interests depend on state law, and California law generally does not give a prisoner a general right to possess property in prison. The court also noted uncertainty about whether the rule from Sandin v. Conner—requiring an atypical and significant hardship for certain prisoner due-process claims—applies to prisoner property claims.

The court assumed, without deciding, that the authorized-property list gave Lopez a right to possess the trimmer and that he could not be deprived of it without due process. Even on that assumption, the court held that Lopez received the process he was owed. He was notified that the trimmer had been withheld and had an opportunity to challenge the decision through the prison grievance system. The final reviewer directed the prison to allow him to possess a trimmer, which the court viewed as correcting any earlier procedural error.

The court also reasoned that a hearing before the trimmer was withheld was not required. Because prison officials considered the trimmer dangerous contraband, the court concluded that prison security made it more sensible to withhold the item first and allow the prisoner to contest the decision afterward. The court stated that prison administrators receive broad deference when adopting policies intended to preserve security and order.

The court separately concluded that the claim against K. Harrington failed because the record did not establish the basis for supervisory liability. A supervisor may be liable when a policy is so deficient that the policy itself repudiates constitutional rights. The court found that prison officials were authorized under state law to seek exemptions from the department’s property list and that a process existed for those requests. The court also noted that the decision concerning the trimmer was made to preserve institutional and inmate safety.

Qualified immunity

Qualified immunity is a protection from civil damages for government officials unless their conduct violated a clearly established statutory or constitutional right that a reasonable official would have understood. The court held that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. Pelican Bay had banned beard trimmers, the defendants acted consistently with that ban, and it would not have been clear to a reasonable officer that enforcing the ban was unlawful. The court also applied this conclusion to Harrington’s disallowance of the item while Pelican Bay was seeking to have trimmers formally disallowed.

Disposition

The court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment in favor of all defendants. It directed the clerk to terminate pending motions, enter judgment for all defendants, and close the file.