Travillian v. Social Security

Background

Trina Travillian applied for Social Security Disability Insurance and Supplemental Security Income, alleging disability beginning June 1, 2004. At her administrative hearing, she changed the alleged onset date to March 31, 2014 and withdrew her application for disability insurance benefits. The dispute before the district court therefore concerned only her Supplemental Security Income application.

Administrative Law Judge Debra M. Underwood found that Travillian had several severe impairments, including arthritis in both knees, major depressive disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, alcohol and cannabis use disorders, and a history of cocaine and heroin use disorder reported to be in remission. The judge determined that Travillian could stand and walk for four hours during an eight-hour workday, perform certain movements occasionally, avoid unprotected heights, and perform simple, routine work with limited pace, decisions, and workplace changes. Relying on a vocational expert’s testimony, the judge found that Travillian could perform other jobs, including inspector, electronic worker, or polisher, and was not disabled.

The Appeals Council declined review, making the administrative law judge’s decision the Commissioner’s final decision. Travillian then filed this case under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), which permits federal-court review of Social Security benefit decisions.

Travillian’s challenges

Travillian argued that the administrative law judge erred by:

- discounting her statements about the severity of her symptoms; - weighing the medical opinions; - finding that her impairments did not meet or equal a listed impairment; - assessing her residual functional capacity, meaning the work she could still perform despite her impairments; and - relying on the vocational expert’s testimony about available jobs.

Analysis

The court held that the administrative law judge had substantial evidence—evidence that a reasonable person could accept as supporting a conclusion—for partially discounting Travillian’s statements. The judge properly relied on Travillian’s relatively conservative treatment for her joint pain and inconsistencies in her reports about daily activities. The court found that the judge improperly treated some psychological symptoms as situational and overstated some of Travillian’s activities, but ruled that those errors were harmless because the valid reasons still supported the credibility finding.

As to the physical medical opinions, the court found no error. The administrative law judge reasonably relied on consultative examiner Omar Bayne, M.D., whose opinion was based on personal examination and was generally consistent with the record. The state-agency medical consultants’ opinions were also largely consistent with Bayne’s opinion.

As to the mental medical opinions, the court found that the administrative law judge properly discounted portions of Maria Kerosky, Ph.D.’s opinion concerning social limitations because those portions relied on Travillian’s statements, which the judge reasonably found not fully credible. The court said it was improper to discount Kerosky’s opinion merely because it came from a one-time examination, but found that error harmless because the remaining reasons supported the result and the rest of Kerosky’s opinion was consistent with the assessed work limitations.

The court similarly found that the administrative law judge gave a valid reason for giving little weight to Katherine Wiebe, Ph.D.’s opinion: the opinion was inconsistent with the overall medical record and Travillian’s limited mental-health treatment. The court identified other improper reasons, including the report’s purpose, the lack of a treating relationship, and the one-time evaluation, but found those errors harmless.

Because Travillian’s arguments about the listed impairments and residual functional capacity depended on her challenges to the credibility finding and medical-opinion analysis, the court rejected those arguments as well. The court also found no apparent conflict between the vocational expert’s testimony and the job descriptions in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles. According to the court, those occupations did not require the frequent changes, complex tasks, independent judgment, or production rates that Travillian identified.

Disposition

Judge Donna M. Ryu denied Travillian’s motion for summary judgment and granted the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment. The Clerk was ordered to enter judgment and close the case.