Marshall v. Berryhill

Background

Carrie A. Marshall applied for supplemental security income and disability insurance benefits under Titles XVI and II of the Social Security Act. Her applications were denied, and an administrative law judge (ALJ), David LaBarre, later found that she was not disabled. The Social Security Appeals Council denied review, after which Marshall filed this case.

Marshall alleged disability based on cardiomyopathy, panic attacks, posttraumatic stress disorder, depression, anxiety, syncope, and vertigo. The ALJ found severe impairments including cardiomyopathy, affective disorder, anxiety disorder, posttraumatic stress disorder, and vertigo. He determined that Marshall could perform sedentary work with physical, safety, and mental restrictions, and that she could perform jobs such as small-parts assembler, hand sander, and check weigher.

Marshall moved for summary judgment, asking the court to reject the ALJ’s decision. The Commissioner of Social Security filed a cross-motion for summary judgment defending the decision.

Medical and Other Evidence

The record included opinions from examining psychologist Ute Kollath, nurse practitioner Elizabeth Mole, and treating cardiac physician Romesh K. Japra. Kollath identified moderate limitations in Marshall’s ability to withstand the stress of a routine workday, interact appropriately with others, and adapt to workplace changes or stressors. Mole diagnosed major depressive disorder and posttraumatic stress disorder and described anxiety, depression, mood swings, poor concentration, sleep problems, flashbacks, and auditory hallucinations. Mole also opined that Marshall would miss more than four days of work per month. Japra described cardiac conditions and symptoms that worsened with stress and exertion and opined that Marshall had substantial sitting, standing, walking, and leg-elevation limitations.

Marshall also testified about panic attacks, anxiety, posttraumatic stress symptoms, physical weakness, dizziness, fainting, chest symptoms, and medications that rarely helped. Her mother, Barbara Marshall, submitted a report describing Marshall’s nervousness, fear of going outside, difficulty being around people, and difficulty getting along with strangers.

Court’s Analysis

The court held that the ALJ inadequately evaluated Kollath’s opinion. The ALJ limited Marshall to simple and routine work with only occasional demanding pressures, but did not explain why she could tolerate even occasional high-pressure demands despite medical opinions and other evidence that she had marked anxiety, anger-control problems, and difficulty interacting with others. The Commissioner’s explanations offered later in court could not replace the reasons the ALJ gave in the decision.

The court also held that the ALJ improperly discounted Mole’s opinions. Although Mole was a nurse practitioner rather than a psychiatrist, the ALJ could discount her opinion only by giving reasons specific to her evidence. The court found that the ALJ’s descriptions of Mole’s examinations as mostly benign did not address the broader treatment records showing ineffective medication, continuing anxiety and depression, mood swings, crying spells, interpersonal altercations, and hallucinations. The court also found that the ALJ improperly relied on the lack of objective evidence of hallucinations and on the vague statement that some limitations existed before the alleged onset date.

As to Japra, the court found that Marshall had not shown that the ALJ necessarily erred in rejecting the specific opinion that she needed to elevate her legs for three to four hours per workday. However, the court held that the ALJ failed to address Japra’s opinion that Marshall’s shortness of breath and chest pressure worsened with stress and exertion. The court directed the ALJ to address those symptoms and, if necessary, obtain clarification or additional information from an examining physician.

The court further held that the ALJ did not give sufficiently specific reasons for rejecting Marshall’s testimony. The ALJ stated generally that her statements were not fully consistent with the evidence, but did not identify the testimony being rejected or the evidence contradicting it. The court also found that the ALJ improperly discounted Barbara Marshall’s statements because she lacked medical training and failed to identify specific conflicts between her statements and the medical evidence.

Disposition

Judge Orrick granted Marshall’s motion for summary judgment and denied the Commissioner’s motion. The case was remanded for further proceedings before the ALJ. The court declined to apply the credit-as-true rule, which can require accepting certain improperly rejected evidence and awarding benefits, because it found that further administrative proceedings would be useful. The court did not decide Marshall’s remaining arguments concerning the precise residual functional capacity or whether the identified sedentary jobs were supported by sufficient evidence.