Carney v. Saul

Background

Jaymie Eileen Marie Carney applied in 2013 for Supplemental Security Income and Child Disability Benefits under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act. She alleged disability based on attention deficit disorder, anxiety disorder, depressive disorder, and Tourette’s disorder. The Social Security Administration denied her applications, and an administrative law judge twice found that she was not disabled. After the Appeals Council denied further review, Carney sought review in federal court.

Carney moved for summary judgment, arguing that the administrative law judge improperly rejected the opinions of examining doctors John Kiefer and Phillip Cushman, treating psychiatrist Michael Loose, and treating therapist Tara Hall. She also challenged the rejection of her testimony and her mother Rhonda Carney’s statements, as well as the administrative law judge’s assessment of her residual functional capacity—the most she could still do in a work setting—and the finding that she could perform jobs available in significant numbers.

Court’s analysis

The court reviews a Social Security decision to determine whether it is supported by substantial evidence and whether the correct legal standards were used. The court held that the administrative law judge did not provide the required specific and legitimate reasons for discounting the opinions of Drs. Kiefer and Cushman, who had examined Carney. The administrative law judge had relied on general statements that their opinions were inconsistent with the record, unsupported by examination findings, based on Carney’s subjective reports, or speculative because Carney had never worked. The court found those reasons inadequate, noting that Dr. Cushman had performed multiple tests and that the doctors’ opinions were consistent with evidence from Dr. Loose, MFT Hall, Rhonda Carney, and Carney herself.

The court also held that the administrative law judge improperly discounted Dr. Loose’s opinions. Dr. Loose had treated Carney for years and described substantial limitations in completing a normal workday and workweek, maintaining attendance, interacting with others, and responding to workplace changes. The court rejected the reasons given for discounting those opinions, including the lack of separate mental examinations and the failure to address substance abuse. The court noted that Dr. Loose’s statement directed the medical provider not to include limitations that would disappear if the person stopped using drugs or alcohol, and that Dr. Loose had stated Carney remained symptomatic despite treatment compliance.

The court further held that the administrative law judge did not provide adequate reasons for rejecting MFT Hall’s opinions. Hall’s assessment identified severe or moderately severe limitations in maintaining attention, following a schedule, sustaining a routine, completing a normal workday, working with others, and interacting socially. The court found that Carney’s ability to respond appropriately during one-time examinations did not show that she could accept sustained instructions in a competitive workplace. It also found that Hall’s failure to address substance abuse was not a valid reason because her assessment instructed her to disregard limitations that would disappear without drug or alcohol use.

Remedy and disposition

The court applied the credit-as-true standard, a rule allowing benefits to be awarded when the record is complete, the administrative law judge gave legally insufficient reasons for rejecting evidence, and accepting that evidence would require a finding of disability. The court found all three conditions satisfied. It also found no serious doubt that Carney was disabled and noted that vocational-expert testimony established that the limitations described by the medical providers would prevent work.

The court granted Carney’s motion for summary judgment, denied Saul’s motion for summary judgment, and remanded the case to the Commissioner for the sole purpose of calculating and awarding benefits.