Hall v. City of Walnut Creek

Background

This civil-rights case under Section 1983, a federal law allowing claims against state or local officials for certain constitutional violations, arose from Walnut Creek police officers shooting and killing Miles Hall. Taun Hall and Scott Hall sued individually and as co-successors-in-interest to Miles Hall. An earlier order dismissed several claims. The plaintiffs then sought permission under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2) to file a second amended complaint with additional allegations.

The proposed allegations included that police had placed a hazard flag on the Hall home for future calls; dispatch had told responding officers that Miles had a mental illness and that the family needed help with his mental-health crisis; Sergeant Holly Conners and Officer Tammy Keagy had decided that Keagy would contact Miles, establish rapport, and de-escalate the situation; and Conners had assigned officers to carry a ballistic shield and a beanbag shotgun and had gestured for Officer Melissa Murphy to ready her taser. The plaintiffs also alleged that Walnut Creek’s taser training and practices were so restrictive that tasers were ineffective in the field, that the department’s mental-health de-escalation training was deficient, and that officers denied Miles a reasonable accommodation because of his mental illness.

Legal standard

The court considered whether amendment would be futile, unduly delayed, prejudicial, or sought in bad faith. An amendment is futile when the proposed allegations still could not support a legally sufficient claim. The court found no undue delay, prejudice, or bad faith. The defendants had not made a prejudice argument, and the proposed amendments concerned existing claims rather than adding new claims or changing the basic nature of the case.

Claims the court allowed to be amended

The court held that the additional allegations made the integral-participation claim against Officer Keagy plausible. The allegations about Keagy’s communications, assignment, planned contact with Miles, and intended de-escalation role supported an inference that she meaningfully participated in the events. The court instructed plaintiffs to include those allegations in the amended complaint.

The court also found that the additional allegations made it plausible that Sergeant Conners had a realistic opportunity to prevent the shooting officers from using deadly force and failed to intervene. The conclusion states that leave to amend all other claims was granted, which included the failure-to-intervene claim against Conners.

As to the claim against Walnut Creek under Monell v. Department of Social Services, the court found the proposed allegations sufficient to plausibly plead a widespread custom and deliberate indifference to training deficiencies. The allegations concerned restrictive taser practices, departure from industry standards, the department’s awareness of those practices, and Chief Tom Chaplin’s alleged personal approval of training decisions. The court nevertheless stated that the proposed complaint still did not plausibly allege that Chaplin, the city council, or another final policymaker had delegated authority to the responding officers to carry out the alleged unconstitutional shooting or had approved that use of force beforehand. Despite that deficiency, the court held that the other amendments to the Monell claim were not futile and allowed leave to amend that claim.

Claims and relief the court did not allow to be amended

The court denied leave to amend the failure-to-intervene claim against Officer Keagy. Although plaintiffs alleged that Keagy planned to contact and de-escalate with Miles and was physically present at the scene, they also alleged that she arrived only after Miles had begun jogging toward the other officers. Because the shooting occurred moments later, the court found it highly improbable that Keagy had a realistic opportunity to prevent it.

The court denied leave to amend the Title II Americans with Disabilities Act claim. Title II applies to governmental bodies, not individual officers, and the court treated Walnut Creek as potentially responsible for the officers’ actions. The proposed allegations plausibly connected Miles’s disability to the alleged denial of a reasonable accommodation, but the court found that they did not plausibly show deliberate indifference. The court reasoned that the hazard flag and the planned de-escalation effort showed an effort to accommodate Miles; the alleged problem was negligence in carrying out that accommodation, not deliberate indifference.

The court also denied leave to amend the request for injunctive relief. It held that the plaintiffs’ fear that Walnut Creek officers might shoot their surviving child during a future police encounter was too speculative to establish a real and immediate threat of future injury or the irreparable harm required for an injunction. The plaintiffs had not alleged that all Walnut Creek officers always acted that way or that Walnut Creek had ordered or authorized such conduct.

Disposition

Judge William Alsup ordered that leave to amend the failure-to-intervene claim against Officer Keagy, the ADA claim, and the equitable remedy of injunctive relief was denied. Leave to amend all other claims was granted. Before filing, plaintiffs were directed to omit their assault-and-battery claims against Sergeant Conners, which the earlier order had explicitly dismissed, as well as the ADA claim and the failure-to-intervene claim against Officer Keagy. They were also directed to include the allegations they had argued concerning Officer Keagy’s integral participation and the deliberate-indifference standard for the Monell claim.