Hall v. City of Walnut Creek

Background

Taun Hall and Scott Hall sued the City of Walnut Creek, Police Chief Tom Chaplin, Sergeant Holly Conners, Officers Matt Smith, Melissa Murphy, K.C. Hsiao, and Tammy Keagy, and other officers identified as Does 1–25. They brought claims under Section 1983, a federal civil-rights law; Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act; and state-law claims including assault, battery, negligence, and wrongful death.

The complaint alleged that Walnut Creek officers responded on June 2, 2019, after the plaintiffs called 911 about their son, Miles Hall. The plaintiffs alleged that Miles had schizoaffective disorder, that Officer Keagy knew about his condition, and that officers used a bean-bag shotgun and then fired six handgun shots at Miles. Officers K.C. Hsiao and Melissa Murphy shot and killed him.

All defendants moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint alleges enough facts to plausibly support a legal claim. The court considered the complaint’s well-pleaded factual allegations as true and viewed them favorably to the plaintiffs for purposes of the motion.

Section 1983 claims against Sergeant Conners and Officer Keagy

The court denied dismissal of the claim that Sergeant Conners was an integral participant in the alleged use of unconstitutional force. The complaint alleged that Conners responded to the call, arrived at the scene, lined up with other officers, and supervised the officers’ conduct. The court concluded that these allegations plausibly showed meaningful participation in the events leading to the shooting.

The court granted dismissal of the integral-participation claim against Officer Keagy. Although the complaint alleged that Keagy responded to the call, arrived at the scene, and approached with a taser in hand, the court found those allegations insufficient to show meaningful participation in the use of force.

The court granted dismissal of the failure-to-intervene claims against both Conners and Keagy. Although the complaint made it possible or conceivable that they had an opportunity to prevent the shooting, the court found that it did not make that opportunity plausible under the pleading standard.

Claims against the City of Walnut Creek

The court granted dismissal of the Section 1983 claim against Walnut Creek under the municipal-liability principles commonly associated with Monell. The complaint did not identify an official policy or widespread custom that caused the alleged constitutional violation. It also did not adequately allege deliberate indifference—a conscious disregard of a known or obvious risk—in its failure-to-train theory. Finally, the complaint did not adequately allege that a final policymaker delegated policymaking authority or ratified the shooting.

The court also granted dismissal of the request for injunctive relief against Walnut Creek. The complaint merely requested an injunction and did not allege facts showing a real and immediate threat of future injury or facts making irreparable injury plausible.

The court granted dismissal of the Title II Americans with Disabilities Act claim against Walnut Creek. The complaint alleged that the City failed to train officers to recognize disability symptoms, failed to use de-escalation tactics, and failed to use tasers. But the court found that the complaint did not allege that Miles’s disability caused the exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination. The court also found that the complaint did not adequately allege the deliberate indifference required for monetary damages under the Act. The court stated that amendment would not be futile.

State-law claims

The court granted dismissal of the assault and battery claims against Sergeant Conners because the plaintiffs did not oppose dismissal. The opinion stated that the complaint did not allege assault and battery claims against Officer Keagy.

The court agreed that the separate negligence claim was duplicative of the wrongful-death claim based on negligence and granted dismissal of the negligence claim. In its conclusion, the court listed the dismissed negligence claims as those against Sergeant Conners and Officers Hsiao, Murphy, Keagy, and Smith.

Official-capacity immunity and standing

The defendants argued that the officers were immune from the Section 1983 claims brought against them in their official capacities. The court denied that portion of the motion, explaining that the officers were local-municipal officers rather than state officers, and that the asserted immunity applied only to state officials.

The defendants also argued that the plaintiffs lacked standing. The court addressed a procedural requirement concerning a personal representative or successor in interest and stated that the plaintiffs had shown in their opposition that they could satisfy it. The court directed them to correct the issue in an amended complaint.

Disposition

The order states that the motion to dismiss was granted in part and denied in part. Its conclusion states that the integral-participation claim against Keagy, the failure-to-intervene claims against Conners and Keagy, the assault and battery claims against Conners, the Monell and ADA claims against Walnut Creek, injunctive relief against Walnut Creek, and specified negligence claims were dismissed. The plaintiffs were permitted to seek leave to amend the dismissed claims by motion and were instructed to plead their best case and explain how any proposed amended complaint would correct the identified deficiencies.