Bryant v. Berryhill

Background

Bryant applied for Supplemental Security Income benefits on July 31, 2014. The Social Security Administration denied the application initially and on reconsideration. An Administrative Law Judge later found Bryant not disabled, and the Appeals Council denied review. Bryant then sought judicial review.

In the earlier round of this case, the court reviewed the parties’ summary-judgment motions and the administrative record. On September 3, 2019, it granted Bryant’s motion in part and sent the matter back to the Social Security Administration for further proceedings. The court found that the Administrative Law Judge had not given legally sufficient, witness-specific reasons for assigning little weight to statements from Jeannie Smith and Sean Nunez of Napa Valley Support Services and from Bryant’s mother.

The earlier order also declined to decide Bryant’s challenge to the Administrative Law Judge’s credibility finding because that issue was connected to the treatment of the lay-witness statements. The court also did not decide whether the Administrative Law Judge’s use of an outdated version of the mental-impairment regulations was harmless, because the lay-witness error prevented the court from making that determination.

Attorneys’ Fees Under the Equal Access to Justice Act

Bryant sought attorneys’ fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, a federal law that generally permits a prevailing party in litigation against the United States to recover reasonable fees unless the government’s position was substantially justified or special circumstances would make an award unjust.

The court found that Bryant was a prevailing party because her lawsuit obtained a remand of the Social Security Administration’s final decision. The court then considered whether the government’s position had a reasonable basis in law and fact. The Commissioner argued that the Administrative Law Judge had reasonable grounds for discounting the lay-witness statements, including precedent recognizing inconsistency with medical evidence as a possible reason to discount such testimony.

The court rejected that argument. It explained that, unlike the precedent cited by the Commissioner, the Administrative Law Judge had not identified specific inconsistencies between Bryant’s mother’s statement and the medical evidence. The court also found that the Administrative Law Judge’s description of Bryant’s daily activities had little basis in the record and minimized the accommodations Bryant needed to work and attend school. Because the remand resulted from a failure to follow well-established rules concerning lay testimony, the court found that the government’s position was not substantially justified. It also found no special circumstances making an award unjust.

Amount of the Award

The Commissioner did not challenge the cost-of-living-adjusted hourly rates used by Bryant’s attorneys or the hours claimed by co-counsel David J. Linden. The Commissioner argued that attorney Ralph Wilborn had spent excessive time reviewing the records, researching the mental-impairment listings, and preparing briefs, and asked the court to limit the award to $7,309.59.

The court found that the claimed hours were not excessive. It awarded $8,977.82 for Wilborn’s 44.5 hours of work and $1,062.37 for Linden’s 5.25 hours, for a subtotal of $10,040.19. The court also approved $1,225.50 for six additional hours Wilborn spent preparing the reply in the fee dispute.

Disposition

Judge Ryu granted Bryant’s motion for an award of attorneys’ fees in the amount of $11,265.69.