Hall-Johnson v. Golden Gate Regional Center Inc.

Background

Carneice Kathrine Hall-Johnson filed the case against Golden Gate Regional Center, Inc. and Tessa McGarvey. The defendants moved to dismiss Hall-Johnson’s first amended complaint. Hall-Johnson represented herself. The court excused her five-day delay in filing her opposition brief, noting that the complaint stated she lived with developmental disabilities and that the motion was briefed during the COVID-19 public health crisis.

The complaint appeared to assert claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged Fourteenth Amendment violations, and Title VI, § 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

Statute of limitations

The court held that Hall-Johnson’s claims were time-barred. Section 1983 claims and Title VI § 601 claims were subject to California’s two-year limitations period for personal-injury actions. Section 1981 claims were subject to a four-year limitations period. The court explained that a claim generally begins to accrue when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury supporting the claim.

Hall-Johnson alleged that a former Golden Gate Regional Center employee first told her around her eighteenth birthday that she would no longer receive services because of her race. The court understood that event to have occurred around 2012, meaning the limitations period would have ended around 2016. Hall-Johnson did not file the case until 2019.

Hall-Johnson also alleged that McGarvey later refused to provide services under Golden Gate Regional Center’s allegedly discriminatory policies and that her mother observed McGarvey treating an older white woman more favorably when seeking the same services. The court said Hall-Johnson did not identify when those events occurred. It further held that later implementation of the original denial of services did not create a separate violation for limitations purposes.

Hall-Johnson alleged that, in June 2019, a defendant refused her request to complete a reasonable-accommodation form needed for her to take a custodian test with the City and County of San Francisco. The court could not determine from the pleadings whether this conduct continued the earlier alleged discrimination or was an independent violation within the limitations period. Without more context, the court held that the June 2019 allegation alone could not save the otherwise untimely claims.

Section 1981 claim

The court identified an additional problem with the § 1981 claim. Section 1981 prohibits race, national-origin, or ancestry discrimination in the making and enforcement of contracts. Hall-Johnson alleged that she attempted to contract for services with the Regional Center and was denied the right to do so. The court said, however, that the substance of her allegations appeared to concern benefits provided by the Lanterman Act rather than a contractual relationship.

The court stated that any amended § 1981 claim would need factual, rather than conclusory, allegations showing a potential or existing contractual relationship.

Ruling

The court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the first amended complaint without prejudice because it could not determine that amendment would be futile. Hall-Johnson was permitted to file a second amended complaint within 30 days of the order’s issuance. The court prohibited adding new claims or parties without court permission or the defendants’ agreement. The order terminated Docket Number 33.