Pine v. City Of Oakland

Background

The case arose from a November 8, 2018 vehicle-pedestrian accident. According to the Third Amended Complaint, Richard Pine struck a pedestrian while turning in Oakland. Pine alleged that he was briefly distracted, believed the resulting impact was caused by a recycling bag falling from his vehicle, stopped, and went back to investigate. Officer Marcos Gocobachi arrived, handcuffed Pine, detained him, and later arrested him for felony assault with a deadly weapon. Pine was held for six days, after which the charge was dismissed and he was released. Pine later learned that his vehicle had been impounded; he alleged that he could not afford the retrieval fees and lost the vehicle and items inside it.

Pine alleged that Gocobachi, Lesa Leonis, and Jose Vazquez violated his rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the federal civil-rights statute, and asserted state-law claims for false imprisonment, conversion, and trespass to chattels. He asserted all claims against the three officers and the state-law claims against the City of Oakland under California Government Code section 815.2. The opinion states that Pine initially proceeded without a lawyer but retained counsel before filing the Second Amended Complaint.

Motion to Dismiss for Defective Service

The defendants moved under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(4) and 12(b)(5), which address defects in the summons and improper service. They argued that the court lacked jurisdiction over Leonis and Vazquez because neither officer had been properly served. Pine conceded that he had not served them within the 90-day period but argued that he had mailed requests for waivers of service and sought an extension.

The court explained that merely mailing a request for a waiver does not complete service. The defendant must sign and return the waiver, and the plaintiff must file the executed waiver within the applicable period. Pine had not filed executed waivers, and there was no indication that either officer had agreed to waive service.

The court nevertheless denied the motion to dismiss these officers. It found that the circumstances favored a discretionary extension, including the officers’ apparent notice of the lawsuit through their counsel, the absence of claimed prejudice, the lack of any indication of bad faith, and the efficiency of resolving the same claims together. The court ordered Pine to properly serve Leonis and Vazquez and file proof of service or executed waivers by June 1, 2020. It stated that failure to comply would result in dismissal of those defendants without prejudice and without further notice.

Request for Judicial Notice

The defendants asked the court to take judicial notice of a two-page letter concerning a post-impound hearing about Pine’s vehicle. The court granted that request only as to the existence of the hearing and the hearing officer’s decision. It declined to recognize as established fact that evidence had been presented during the hearing because Pine disputed that point and the contents of the decision could not be accepted for the truth of disputed assertions at the motion-to-dismiss stage.

Failure-to-Exhaust Argument

The defendants argued that Pine’s conversion and trespass-to-chattels claims were barred because he had not sought judicial review of the administrative decision through a California administrative-mandamus proceeding. They characterized the administrative decision as having preclusive effect, meaning that it would prevent Pine from relitigating issues decided there.

The court denied this part of the motion. It explained that preclusion based on an administrative decision requires, among other things, a final decision on the merits and proceedings with a judicial character. The defendants had not shown that the applicable law required the hearing officer to take evidence in a manner that made the administrative-mandamus procedure controlling. The parties also disputed facts about the hearing’s procedures. Because the court could not resolve those factual disputes on a motion to dismiss, and because doing so would require consideration of material outside the pleadings or conversion of the motion into one for summary judgment, it denied the request to dismiss the conversion and trespass-to-chattels claims on exhaustion grounds.

Claims Against the City

The defendants argued that the City should be dismissed because it was not listed in the heading of each cause of action. The court rejected that argument. The complaint specifically alleged that the City was liable under section 815.2 for the tortious acts of its employee officers, and the defendants did not challenge the sufficiency of those allegations or argue that the officers were immune from suit. The court therefore denied the motion to dismiss the City.

Disposition

The court denied the defendants’ motion under Rules 12(b)(4) and 12(b)(5). It directed the clerk to issue an amended summons for the Third Amended Complaint and required Pine to serve Leonis and Vazquez by June 1, 2020. The court also denied the defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim. The case therefore was not dismissed by this order, although the order warned that Leonis and Vazquez would be dismissed without prejudice if Pine failed to complete service by the deadline.