Marysarah L. v. Saul
- Thomas Hixson
- 3:19-cv-01409
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 14
In Marysarah L. v. Saul, Judge Hixson upheld the denial of disability benefits and granted Saul’s summary-judgment motion.
Marysarah L., whose denial of Social Security disability benefits was upheld; the Commissioner of Social Security, whose cross-motion for summary judgment was granted.
What happened
In Marysarah L. v. Saul, Marysarah L. asked the court to review the Social Security Commissioner’s decision denying her disability benefits. An administrative law judge found that she had several severe impairments but could perform her past work as a chef and athletic trainer.
Marysarah L. argued that the decision lacked adequate supporting evidence, that medical reports from 2019 required another review, and that her lawyer had represented her poorly at the administrative hearing. The court reviewed her medical records, testimony, daily activities, and the testimony of medical and vocational experts.
Judge Hixson denied Marysarah L.’s motion for summary judgment and granted the Commissioner’s cross-motion. He ruled that substantial evidence supported the administrative law judge’s finding that she was not disabled, that the later medical reports did not justify a remand, and that her lawyer-related argument did not provide a basis for reversal.
The detailed version
- Marysarah L. v. Saul · No. 3:19-cv-01409
- Thomas Hixson
- May 18, 2020
Background
Marysarah L. sought judicial review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) of the Commissioner of Social Security’s final decision denying her claim for Disability Insurance Benefits. She alleged that she became unable to work on August 15, 2014. After the agency denied her claim and her request for reconsideration, Administrative Law Judge Betty Barbeito held a hearing on August 22, 2017. Marysarah L. testified at the hearing and was represented by counsel. The administrative law judge issued an unfavorable decision on December 20, 2017, and the Appeals Council declined review on January 16, 2019.
The administrative law judge found that Marysarah L. had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since August 15, 2014. The judge identified angina pectoris without ischemic heart disease, fibromyalgia, abdominal pain with intestinal blockage, back pain, and high blood pressure as severe impairments. The judge found that these impairments did not meet or equal a listed impairment and determined that Marysarah L. had the residual functional capacity—the most she could still do in a work setting—to perform medium work with specified lifting, standing, walking, and sitting limits. Based on that capacity, the administrative law judge found that she could perform her past work as a chef and athletic trainer.
Motions and Arguments
The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Marysarah L., who represented herself in the federal case, appeared to argue that the administrative law judge’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence, that medical reports from Mexico dated October and December 2019 warranted a remand, and that her lawyer at the administrative hearing had provided ineffective assistance.
The court considered Marysarah L.’s testimony that she experienced severe abdominal pain, intestinal blockages, vomiting, fatigue, bleeding, and other limitations. It also reviewed the medical evidence discussed by the administrative law judge, including imaging that generally showed no bowel obstruction or adhesions, examinations that were normal or unremarkable aside from some findings, evidence concerning cardiac complaints, and evidence concerning fibromyalgia and fatigue. Medical expert Dr. Robert Sklaroff testified that the record did not establish a disabling impairment and that Marysarah L. could stand, walk, and sit for six hours in an eight-hour workday with normal breaks.
Court’s Analysis
The court applied the substantial-evidence standard. Under that standard, an administrative law judge’s decision must be upheld if it is supported by relevant evidence that a reasonable person could accept as adequate, even though the evidence need not be overwhelming. The court must consider the record as a whole, including evidence supporting and detracting from the agency’s decision. When the evidence reasonably supports more than one interpretation, the administrative law judge’s reasonable interpretation controls.
The court held that substantial evidence supported the finding that Marysarah L. was not disabled. It noted evidence that imaging repeatedly showed no obstruction or ileus, several doctors did not believe a laparotomy was required, treatment for an anal fissure helped her bowel movements, and she reported some improvement. The court also found that the administrative law judge reasonably relied on Dr. Sklaroff’s opinion because it was consistent with the record. In addition, the court concluded that Marysarah L.’s reported activities—including cooking, cleaning, running errands, attending lunch with friends, driving to appointments, and riding a bicycle—reasonably supported the administrative law judge’s assessment of her limitations.
The court rejected the request to consider the 2019 medical reports as a basis for remand. The reports were issued nearly two years after the administrative law judge’s decision, and Marysarah L. did not show that they related to the relevant period or that there was a reasonable possibility they would have changed the administrative hearing’s outcome. She also did not establish good cause for failing to submit the evidence earlier. The court noted that she could submit a new application concerning a period after the administrative law judge’s decision.
The court also rejected the ineffective-assistance argument. It held that there is no constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel at a Social Security hearing, so the allegation about the lawyer did not provide a basis to reverse or remand the agency’s decision.
Disposition
The court DENIED Marysarah L.’s motion for summary judgment and GRANTED the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment. The court stated that it would enter a separate judgment and that the Clerk would terminate the case.
Read the full 14-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.