Mccoy v. Social Security Administration

Background

LaTreasha McCoy sought supplemental security income under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, alleging disability based on degenerative bone disease, scoliosis, depression, and other mental and physical conditions. An administrative law judge (ALJ) found that she had severe impairments including degenerative disc disease, scoliosis, affective disorders, anxiety disorder, and post-traumatic stress disorder. The ALJ determined that McCoy had the residual functional capacity (RFC)—the most she could still do despite her impairments—to perform medium work and simple, routine, unskilled tasks. Relying on the Medical-Vocational Guidelines, commonly called the “grids,” the ALJ found that jobs existed in significant numbers that she could perform. The Appeals Council declined review.

McCoy filed this federal action and the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. She argued that the ALJ improperly weighed medical and other source opinions, improperly discounted her statements about her symptoms, incorrectly found that her impairments did not meet or equal Listing 12.15 for trauma- and stressor-related disorders, and should have obtained testimony from a vocational expert (VE) about her ability to perform other work.

Medical and Other Source Opinions

The court held that the ALJ did not provide legally sufficient reasons for giving significant weight to the opinions of nonexamining state-agency consultants Owen Daniels, M.D., and R. Warren, M.D., while giving little weight to more restrictive opinions from examining and treating sources. The court explained that, because the nonexamining consultants’ opinions conflicted with opinions from sources who examined or treated McCoy, the ALJ needed specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence.

The court found the ALJ’s reasons inadequate as to psychologist Lisa Kalich, Psy.D. The fact that Kalich examined McCoy only once was not enough, particularly because the ALJ gave significant weight to another physician who also examined McCoy once. The ALJ also did not explain why McCoy’s cocaine use one month before the evaluation justified discounting Kalich’s opinion or why Kalich’s assessment was overly dependent on McCoy’s subjective reports. The ALJ’s limitation to simple, routine, unskilled work also did not account for the social and attendance-related limitations Kalich identified.

The court likewise found that the ALJ did not adequately explain his decision to give little weight to the opinions of psychiatrist Aislinn Bird, M.D., and psychologist Lesleigh Franklin, Ph.D. Their having examined McCoy only once was not a legitimate reason to prefer the opinions of consultants who never examined her. The ALJ’s statements that their opinions were overly reliant on McCoy’s reports were not supported by substantial evidence, and the ALJ did not sufficiently explain how McCoy’s earlier attendance at barber college and short period of cutting hair contradicted their later assessments. The court also concluded that treatment gaps and alleged noncompliance with treatment did not constitute specific and legitimate reasons on this record, which included evidence of homelessness, avoidance, crisis, and other psychosocial stressors.

The court also held that the ALJ failed to provide germane reasons—reasons specifically relevant to the witness—for discounting the opinions of social worker Kari Jennings-Parriott. Although social workers are considered “other sources” rather than acceptable medical sources under the applicable rules, the ALJ still had to give adequate reasons for rejecting her opinions. The court found that the ALJ did not sufficiently explain why the absence of recent psychiatric hospitalization was inconsistent with Jennings-Parriott’s assessment, and that the reference to inconsistency with the medical evidence was too vague.

McCoy’s Symptom Statements

The court rejected McCoy’s challenge to the ALJ’s evaluation of her pain and other symptom statements. Because the ALJ did not find that McCoy was malingering, he had to provide specific, clear, and convincing reasons supported by substantial evidence for discounting her statements. The court concluded that the ALJ met that requirement by identifying the alleged limitations and discussing evidence that included generally mild treatment findings, a normal gait and other normal findings during an orthopedic examination, a later examination showing normal range of motion and strength, limited treatment for physical conditions after the SSI application, and McCoy’s reported use of over-the-counter pain medication.

Listing 12.15

Listing 12.15 concerns trauma- and stressor-related disorders. The ALJ found moderate limitations in all four areas relevant to the listing’s “paragraph B” criteria: understanding, remembering, or applying information; interacting with others; concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace; and adapting or managing oneself.

The court did not finally decide whether McCoy met or equaled Listing 12.15. Because the ALJ improperly evaluated the medical and other source opinions, the court could not determine whether the ALJ had properly considered all relevant evidence in assessing the paragraph B criteria. The court also could not conclude that the ALJ was excused from addressing the listing’s paragraph A criteria.

Step-Five Work Analysis

At the fifth step of the disability analysis, the Commissioner must show that significant numbers of jobs exist in the national economy that the claimant can perform. An ALJ may use the grids when they fully and accurately reflect the claimant’s limitations, but vocational-expert testimony is required when non-exertional limitations significantly restrict the range of work allowed by the claimant’s physical limitations.

Although a VE attended McCoy’s administrative hearing, the ALJ did not ask the VE a hypothetical question addressing McCoy’s mental limitations. Instead, the ALJ relied solely on the grids and found that her additional limitations had little or no effect on the occupational base of unskilled medium work. Because the ALJ had not properly evaluated the more restrictive treating and examining source opinions, the court found it unclear whether McCoy’s non-exertional limitations significantly restricted the available work. On remand, the ALJ might therefore need to obtain VE testimony.

Disposition

The court stated that an award of benefits was not appropriate because the record did not clearly require a finding that McCoy was disabled after the evidence was properly evaluated. It ordered further proceedings, including proper evaluation of the medical and other source evidence and any resulting reconsideration of Listing 12.15, McCoy’s RFC, and her ability to work.

The court granted in part and denied in part McCoy’s motion for summary judgment. It also granted in part and denied in part the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment. The matter was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the order, and the clerk was directed to enter judgment and close the file. Judge Virginia K. DeMarchi issued the order.