Bey v. Malec

Background

Raq Bey filed a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) seeking to alter the court’s April 28, 2020 judgment. That earlier order resolved the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment without oral argument. The court analyzed six alleged uses of excessive force arising from Bey’s October 31, 2017 arrest and found each use reasonable and not excessive. It also found that the defendants had probable cause to use force and that, even if the force had been excessive, the officers were entitled to qualified immunity.

Bey represented himself. The court vacated the June 26, 2020 hearing and decided the motion based on the submitted papers.

Legal standard

A Rule 59(e) motion allows a court to correct its own judgment in limited circumstances. The court explained that altering a judgment may be appropriate to correct a clear legal or factual error, consider previously unavailable or undiscoverable evidence, correct a manifest injustice, or apply intervening controlling law. The moving party faces a high hurdle, and the motion may not be used simply to relitigate earlier issues or present arguments and evidence that could reasonably have been presented earlier.

Bey’s arguments and the court’s analysis

Bey argued that the court had considered only the defendants’ evidence. The court disagreed, stating that it had considered Bey’s complaint, declaration, and opposition to summary judgment, along with the defendants’ documents, body-camera footage, and relevant case law.

Bey also argued that the excessive-force analysis was wrong because the illegal U-turn was not a serious offense. The court stated that it had considered the traffic offenses together with Bey’s continued disregard of the defendants’ orders and concluded that the use of force was reasonable.

Bey challenged the court’s finding of probable cause and argued that qualified immunity should not apply because he was never charged with a crime and the defendants did not explain the reasons for his arrest. The court rejected those arguments. It stated that dismissal of charges does not eliminate probable cause and that qualified immunity depends on whether the officers’ conduct was objectively legally reasonable under clearly established law. The court found its qualified-immunity ruling supported by case law and noted that the City of Emeryville had been dismissed as a defendant.

Bey sought to introduce articles about police brutality and people impersonating police officers, as well as oral testimony about the parties’ state of mind. The court found that the articles had been published before Bey filed his opposition to summary judgment and therefore were not previously unavailable. It also found that Bey had opportunities to provide relevant testimony through his deposition and a sworn declaration. The court stated that excessive-force analysis focuses on objective reasonableness rather than the parties’ true state of mind, although it had considered Bey’s fear and concluded that the force remained reasonable because he repeatedly failed to follow explicit commands.

The court further found that Bey had not shown the prior decision was clearly unjust. It said his arguments were general and conclusory, while the record showed that the court had considered evidence from both sides and body-camera footage. Finally, the court found that Bey had not identified intervening controlling law. The cases he cited were not controlling, predated his original complaint, or were irrelevant to the excessive-force claim.

Disposition

The court denied Bey’s motion to alter judgment. The order did not change the prior summary-judgment ruling. It also vacated the scheduled hearing.