Gloria Rodriguez v. Comcast Inc.

Background

Gloria Rodriguez worked as a customer service representative for Comcast until Comcast terminated her employment effective December 16, 2015. She had suffered a brain hemorrhage in March 2015 and remained on leave. Her doctor provided medical certifications describing vision, balance, speech, and other limitations. The certifications eventually identified April 19, 2016, as the expected date when she could return to work, although the doctor acknowledged that recovery from a complex brain injury could not be predicted with certainty.

Rodriguez alleged claims under California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) for disability discrimination, failure to provide a reasonable accommodation, failure to engage in the interactive process, retaliation, and failure to prevent discrimination. She also alleged wrongful termination in violation of public policy. Comcast argued that Rodriguez was seeking indefinite leave and could not establish that she was qualified to perform her job.

The court had previously granted summary judgment on some issues, but not all. After the case returned from the Ninth Circuit, the court addressed the remaining issues in Comcast’s motion.

Finite leave and FEHA claims

For Rodriguez’s disability-discrimination, accommodation, and interactive-process claims, the court explained that she had to show that she could perform the essential functions of her job with or without a reasonable accommodation. The court held that a reasonable juror could conclude that Rodriguez requested additional leave through a definite date, rather than indefinite leave. Her doctor did not consider the leave indefinite or Rodriguez permanently disabled, and he believed she would be able to heal and work again.

The court also noted that Comcast did not argue that extending Rodriguez’s leave through mid-April 2016—approximately thirteen months in total—was itself unreasonable. Comcast could have sought clarification from the doctor or granted the extension while stating that any further leave would be unreasonable. Because the court could not decide as a matter of law that the request was indefinite, unreasonable, or incapable of allowing Rodriguez to return to work, it denied summary judgment on Rodriguez’s first claim for disability discrimination, second claim for failure to accommodate, third claim for failure to engage in the interactive process, and sixth claim for failure to prevent discrimination. It also denied summary judgment on her seventh claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy.

Retaliation

Rodriguez argued that Comcast retaliated against her for requesting additional leave as an accommodation. The court found no evidence of a causal connection between her request and Comcast’s termination decision. Viewing the evidence in Rodriguez’s favor, the court concluded that Comcast terminated her because it believed she could not return to work in mid-April, not because she requested an accommodation. The court therefore granted Comcast’s motion for summary judgment on Rodriguez’s fifth claim for retaliation under FEHA.

Mitigation of damages

Comcast sought summary judgment on Rodriguez’s damages claims, arguing that she failed to reduce her losses by seeking or accepting other work. Comcast offered to reinstate her to the same or a substantially similar job, but Rodriguez rejected the offer. The court found factual disputes about whether that rejection was reasonable, given evidence that Rodriguez suffered severe depression and feared Comcast would treat her badly again. The court also found factual disputes about whether she acted reasonably in looking for other employment. It therefore denied Comcast’s motion for summary judgment on this ground.

Punitive damages

Rodriguez sought punitive damages. Under California law, she had to present clear and convincing evidence that a qualifying corporate decision-maker acted with malice, oppression, or fraud. The court found that Rodriguez had not presented evidence showing that Sarah Stofferahn had substantial discretionary authority over decisions that determined corporate policy, as required for an employee to qualify as a corporate “managing agent.”

The court alternatively held that, even if Stofferahn could be considered a managing agent, Rodriguez had not shown that Stofferahn acted with malice, oppression, or fraud. Stofferahn believed Rodriguez would not be able to return to work in April 2016 and that Rodriguez was seeking indefinite leave. Although a jury could find that Stofferahn was mistaken, the court found no evidence supporting punitive damages. It therefore granted Comcast’s motion for summary judgment on Rodriguez’s request for punitive damages.

Disposition

Judge Sallie Kim granted in part and denied in part Comcast’s motion for summary judgment. The order denied summary judgment on the specified FEHA, wrongful-termination, and damages-mitigation issues, and granted summary judgment on the retaliation claim and punitive-damages request.