La Clinica De La Raza v. Biden

Background

The plaintiffs challenged the Department of Homeland Security’s final rule titled “Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds.” The rule changed how the agency evaluates whether a noncitizen seeking admission or lawful permanent resident status is likely to become a public charge. The plaintiffs were La Clínica de la Raza, the California Primary Care Association, several healthcare and legal organizations, and other organizations identified in the first amended complaint.

The first amended complaint asserted eight causes of action: four claims under the Administrative Procedure Act, claims under the Federal Vacancies Reform Act and the Department of Homeland Security’s organic statute concerning agency appointments, a Fifth Amendment claim, and a claim under the Declaratory Judgment Act concerning an allegedly unlawful agency-director appointment. The defendants moved to dismiss.

Threshold challenges

The court denied the motion as to standing. It concluded that the organizational plaintiffs adequately alleged injuries because the rule could require them to divert resources, increase operating costs, reduce use of their services, and lose related funding or revenue. The court also denied the motion as to ripeness, finding that the challenge presented a sufficiently concrete dispute and that the plaintiffs alleged current effects from the rule.

The court also denied the motion as to the zone-of-interests issue. That test asks whether a plaintiff’s interests are sufficiently related to the purposes of the law being challenged to permit the plaintiff to sue under it. The court concluded that the plaintiffs could not be said, as a matter of law, to fall outside the zone of interests for their Administrative Procedure Act claims. It also declined to apply that test to the plaintiffs’ constitutional claims.

McAleenan appointment claims

The court granted the motion to dismiss the third, fifth, and eighth causes of action concerning Acting Secretary McAleenan. The plaintiffs argued that McAleenan was not properly placed in the acting-secretary succession because the applicable succession order made him seventh rather than third in line. The court reasoned that Executive Order 13753 gave the President discretion to depart from the listed succession order if the appointment complied with the Federal Vacancies Reform Act. Because the plaintiffs did not allege that McAleenan failed to meet one of the Act’s requirements for a temporary appointment, the court concluded that the appointment challenge could not proceed.

Cuccinelli appointment claims

The court granted the motion to dismiss the fourth, sixth, and eighth causes of action concerning Acting USCIS Director Cuccinelli. The plaintiffs argued that Cuccinelli’s appointment violated the Federal Vacancies Reform Act and that his involvement made the public-charge rule unlawful or void. The court held that the rule was issued under Acting Secretary McAleenan’s authority and signature, not Cuccinelli’s authority or USCIS’s authority. Even assuming Cuccinelli’s appointment was unlawful, the court concluded that the plaintiffs could not state an Administrative Procedure Act or Federal Vacancies Reform Act claim based on the rule’s promulgation. The court found that further amendment would be futile.

Fifth Amendment claim

The defendants argued that the plaintiffs’ Fifth Amendment equal-protection claim should be dismissed because the rule was facially neutral and the plaintiffs had not plausibly alleged discriminatory intent. The plaintiffs relied on the rule’s alleged disparate effects, statements by the President and administration officials, and an alleged departure from ordinary procedures.

The court concluded that the alleged disparate impact alone was insufficient. It also found that the President’s statements were not sufficiently connected to the rulemaking, that the statements by Cuccinelli and another official were not tied to the rulemaking process, and that allegations that the rule was expedited did not plausibly suggest discriminatory intent. The court granted the motion to dismiss the Fifth Amendment claim and expressly dismissed it with leave to amend.

Deferred rulings and disposition

The court deferred ruling on the motion to dismiss the first and second causes of action, which challenged the rule as contrary to law and arbitrary and capricious. The court had previously reached preliminary views on those claims, but deferred a final ruling because of the Ninth Circuit’s related proceedings and overlapping issues in a related case.

In its conclusion, the court denied the motion to dismiss as to standing, ripeness, and zone of interests. It granted the motion to dismiss the third through sixth and eighth causes of action under the Administrative Procedure Act, Federal Vacancies Reform Act, and Declaratory Judgment Act, and dismissed those claims without leave to amend. It granted the motion to dismiss the seventh cause of action under the Fifth Amendment and dismissed that claim with leave to amend. It deferred ruling on the first and second causes of action and permitted an amended complaint after resolution of those deferred claims. Judge Hamilton therefore issued a partial procedural ruling rather than a final decision on the legality of the public-charge rule itself.