La Clinica De La Raza v. Biden

Background

The organizational plaintiffs challenged the Department of Homeland Security’s final rule titled “Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds.” The rule defines “public charge” and establishes criteria immigration officials use when deciding whether a noncitizen seeking lawful admission or lawful permanent resident status is likely to become a public charge. The plaintiffs asserted eight claims under the Administrative Procedure Act, the Federal Vacancies Reform Act, the Department of Homeland Security’s organic statute, the Fifth Amendment, and the Declaratory Judgment Act.

The court had previously issued a preliminary injunction covering specified geographic areas, but the Ninth Circuit stayed that injunction. Other injunctions were also stayed, and the rule went into effect on February 24, 2020.

Standing and Ripeness

The defendants argued that the plaintiffs lacked Article III standing, meaning a sufficient injury connected to the challenged government action, and that the claims were not ripe, meaning ready for judicial decision. The plaintiffs alleged that the rule would require them to divert staff time and other resources, reduce use of their services, and reduce funding connected to those services.

The court held that the plaintiffs adequately alleged standing under a diversion-of-resources theory and by alleging direct financial consequences. The court also held that the claims were ripe because the challenge presented a legal question about a final agency rule and the plaintiffs alleged current harms. The court DENIED the motion with respect to standing and DENIED the motion with respect to ripeness.

Zone of Interests

The defendants argued that the plaintiffs were outside the “zone of interests,” a requirement that generally asks whether a plaintiff’s interests are sufficiently related to the statute being invoked to permit the plaintiff to sue under it. The court concluded that the plaintiffs could not be said, as a matter of law, to fall outside the zone of interests for their Administrative Procedure Act claims. The court also declined to apply a zone-of-interests test to the plaintiffs’ constitutional claims.

The court DENIED the motion with respect to the zone-of-interests challenge.

First and Second Claims

The first and second claims challenged the public-charge rule as contrary to law and arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act. The court noted that its earlier preliminary-injunction order had found likely success on those claims, while a Ninth Circuit motions panel had reached different conclusions about the rule’s interpretation of the immigration statute and whether the agency had adequately considered relevant costs and effects.

Because of the procedural posture and the overlap with a related case, the court DEFERS RULING ON the defendants’ motion to dismiss the first and second causes of action until the Ninth Circuit issues an opinion on the preliminary injunction or otherwise disposes of the case.

Claims Concerning McAleenan’s Appointment

The third, fifth, and eighth claims challenged Chad McAleenan’s service as Acting Secretary of Homeland Security. The plaintiffs alleged that the applicable succession rules placed other Senate-confirmed officials ahead of McAleenan and that his appointment, and his approval of the rule, were unlawful. The defendants argued that a 2019 succession order placed the Customs and Border Protection Commissioner third in line.

The court concluded that the 2019 order replaced only an annex concerning succession during a disaster or catastrophic emergency. The court determined that, when the Secretary resigned, Executive Order 13753 governed succession, and that the plaintiffs plausibly alleged McAleenan was ineligible to assume the position. The court therefore DENIED the defendants’ motion to dismiss the third, fifth, and eighth causes of action pertaining to McAleenan’s appointment.

Claims Concerning Cuccinelli’s Appointment

The fourth, sixth, and eighth claims challenged Kenneth Cuccinelli’s appointment as Acting Director of the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. The plaintiffs argued that Cuccinelli’s alleged violation of the Federal Vacancies Reform Act affected the rule because of his involvement before promulgation. The defendants argued that the rule was issued under McAleenan’s authority and signature, not Cuccinelli’s.

The court held that the rule was issued under McAleenan’s authority and that the plaintiffs were challenging the rule’s promulgation, not an action issued under Cuccinelli’s authority. The court concluded that, even if Cuccinelli’s appointment were unlawful, the plaintiffs could not state an Administrative Procedure Act or Federal Vacancies Reform Act claim concerning the promulgation of this rule. The court GRANTED the defendants’ motion to dismiss the fourth, sixth, and eighth causes of action pertaining to Cuccinelli’s appointment. The claims were DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.

Seventh Claim: Fifth Amendment Equal Protection

The seventh claim alleged that the public-charge rule violated the equal-protection component of the Fifth Amendment. The plaintiffs alleged that the rule would affect communities of color more heavily and relied on statements by the President and other administration officials, as well as allegations that the rulemaking process was improperly accelerated.

The court applied the framework from Village of Arlington Heights for evaluating whether discriminatory purpose plausibly motivated government action. It concluded that the alleged disparate impact, statements not sufficiently connected to the rulemaking decision, and allegations that the rule was fast-tracked did not provide enough factual support for an equal-protection claim. The court GRANTED the defendants’ motion to dismiss the seventh cause of action. The claim was DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

President as a Defendant

The defendants also argued that the President should be dismissed as a defendant. The court declined to decide that issue at that stage. It noted that the order dismissed all non-Administrative Procedure Act claims against the defendants and therefore did not need to address the issue further.

Disposition

The court DENIED the motion to dismiss as to standing, ripeness, and the zone-of-interests challenges, and as to the third, fifth, and eighth causes of action pertaining to McAleenan’s appointment. It GRANTED the motion to dismiss the fourth, sixth, and eighth causes of action pertaining to Cuccinelli’s appointment and DISMISSED those claims WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. It GRANTED the motion to dismiss the seventh cause of action and DISMISSED that claim WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. It DEFERS RULING ON the motion to dismiss the first and second causes of action. The plaintiffs were permitted to file an amended complaint after resolution of the deferred claims.