SPRAWLDEF v. City of Richmond

Background

Petitioners Paul Carman, Citizens for East Shore Parks, James Hanson, SPRAWLDEF, Pamela Stello, and Tony Sustak brought a petition against Mayor Tom Butt, the City of Richmond, and the Richmond City Council. The petition alleged that the respondents violated California’s Brown Act, the state law governing open meetings, by approving a settlement agreement and resulting judgment in the separate Guidiville action concerning Point Molate.

The petitioners alleged that the settlement and original judgment provided land-use entitlements and should have been approved by the City Council in open session. The City disputed that allegation, arguing that the Brown Act contains an exception allowing approval of a litigation settlement in closed session.

After the petition was filed, the City, the Tribe, and Upstream Point Molate LLC agreed to a proposed amended judgment. The City said the amendment confirmed that it retained discretion regarding development-related entitlements. The Richmond City Council considered and approved the proposed amended judgment at a public hearing on November 5, 2019, and the amended judgment was entered in the Guidiville action on November 21, 2019.

Motions and legal standard

The petitioners sought a preliminary injunction barring further implementation of the settlement agreement and judgment while an appeal by the Tribe was pending. They also sought a temporary restraining order barring implementation until the court decided the preliminary-injunction motion.

The court applied the ordinary standard for preliminary injunctive relief. A party seeking that relief must show a likelihood of success on the merits, likely irreparable harm without relief, a favorable balance of equities, and that an injunction would serve the public interest. The court stated that it could preserve the status quo during an appeal so long as doing so would not materially alter the case on appeal.

Court’s analysis

The court focused on the first required showing: likelihood of success. Under California Government Code section 54960.1, a person may seek a court determination that certain actions taken in violation of specified Brown Act provisions are void. The statute also allows a legislative body to cure or correct a challenged action. If the court determines that the action has been cured or corrected during the case, the statute provides that the action must be dismissed with prejudice.

The court noted that the petitioners acknowledged that the settlement agreement and judgment had been amended. The record indicated, and the petitioners did not dispute, that the amended settlement agreement and proposed amended judgment were placed on the agenda, considered at an open City Council meeting, and approved there. The petitioners argued that the amended judgment continued the land-use decisions allegedly made through a closed-session “secret deal,” but they did not explain why approving those decisions in an open, noticed meeting would not cure the alleged Brown Act violation.

The court stated that it could not reach the merits of the underlying petition while the Tribe’s appeal was pending. It nevertheless considered the changed facts in evaluating the likelihood of success on the injunction request. The court concluded that approval of the amended judgment in an open meeting appeared to preclude the Brown Act claim, and that the petitioners had not shown that the claim was likely to remain viable after the City’s corrective action.

Because the petitioners failed to show a likelihood of success, the court did not consider irreparable harm, the balance of equities, or the public-interest factors. It also rejected the petitioners’ reliance on cases involving constitutional rights and statutory enforcement, explaining that the Brown Act specifically permits the government body to cure the type of open-meeting defect alleged here.

Disposition

The court DENIED the motion for a preliminary injunction for failure to establish a likelihood of success on the merits. It DENIED AS MOOT the motion for a temporary restraining order because the court had decided the preliminary-injunction motion. The order terminated Docket Nos. 103 and 126. The order was signed by Judge Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers.