Cupp v. Smith

Background

Ronald Cupp alleged that Andrew Smith, a Sonoma County code inspector, entered his property on February 15, 2019, and that Sonoma County later issued citations for unlawful land use and construction without a permit. Sonoma County also began abatement proceedings and assessed approximately $93,000 in penalties as of May 15, 2020. Cupp brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for an unreasonable search, denial of due process, and excessive fines; claims under §§ 1985 and 1986; and state-law claims for trespass, “land patent infringement,” and slander of title. He sought monetary and injunctive relief.

Defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint states a legally sufficient claim. Cupp moved to disqualify Sonoma County’s counsel from representing both the county and the individual defendants.

Motion to Dismiss

The court held that the Younger abstention doctrine barred Cupp’s requests for injunctive relief concerning enforcement of the property code violations. That doctrine generally limits federal-court interference with certain ongoing state proceedings. The court found that Sonoma County’s inspection and enforcement proceedings were ongoing, involved important governmental interests, and provided Cupp an opportunity to raise constitutional challenges. Because the requested injunction would practically stop those proceedings, the court dismissed all requests for injunctive relief with prejudice.

The court did not apply sovereign immunity to the defendants’ claims for money damages. It then considered whether Cupp adequately pleaded those claims.

The court dismissed the § 1983 unreasonable-search claim against Smith without prejudice. It found Cupp’s complaint too conclusory but determined that additional facts in Cupp’s supplemental declaration might cure the deficiencies. The court allowed one opportunity to amend, including details about how Smith entered the property and what he observed. The court also said Cupp could clarify a possible claim against Sonoma County based on the alleged search. The court did not decide Smith’s qualified-immunity defense because it considered that issue premature.

The court dismissed Cupp’s § 1983 due-process claim with prejudice. The citations gave Cupp an opportunity to request a hearing, but the court found that he did not timely request one and instead conditioned any request on receiving additional information and resolving other issues first. The court concluded that amendment could not change those prior communications.

The court dismissed the § 1983 excessive-fines claim with prejudice. Cupp did not provide facts or legal argument applying the constitutional excessive-fines test to the county’s civil fines, and the court found that his conclusory allegations did not show that the penalties were grossly disproportionate. The court also dismissed with prejudice any alternative claim that the fines constituted an unconstitutional taking.

The court dismissed the § 1985 conspiracy and § 1986 failure-to-prevent claims with prejudice. Cupp did not provide specific facts showing a conspiracy, and because he failed to state a § 1985 claim, he also could not state a § 1986 claim.

For the state-law claims, the court found that Cupp timely presented his trespass claim but did not allege enough facts to support it. The trespass claim against Smith was dismissed without prejudice, allowing amendment. The trespass claims against Margarett Willet, Tyra Harrington, and Mark Franceschi were dismissed with prejudice because Cupp’s additional declaration did not indicate that they participated in the alleged entry.

The court dismissed the “land patent infringement” claim with prejudice because Cupp identified no legal basis for treating a land patent as an infringement of patent rights. It also dismissed the slander-of-title claim with prejudice. Cupp did not identify a false statement in the recorded abatement notice, and the court found that Sonoma County was justified in recording the notice based on the citations and the alleged failure to abate the violations.

Motion to Disqualify Counsel

The court denied Cupp’s motion to disqualify Sonoma County’s counsel. It found that Cupp had not shown the injury required to establish standing to seek disqualification based on an alleged conflict between the county and its employees. The court also found that California law governed the motion, that there was no automatic rule requiring separate counsel, and that Cupp had not identified facts showing that counsel’s representation created a relevant conflict. The court considered disqualification premature because it had not decided whether Smith could claim qualified immunity or whether Sonoma County could be liable under the rule governing municipal liability.

Disposition

Judge Phyllis J. Hamilton granted defendants’ motion to dismiss and denied Cupp’s motion to disqualify counsel. The court dismissed with prejudice the requests for injunctive relief, the due-process, excessive-fines, conspiracy, neglect, land-patent, and slander-of-title claims, and the trespass claims against Willet, Harrington, and Franceschi. It dismissed without prejudice the unlawful-search claim against Smith and the trespass claim against Smith. Cupp could file an amended pleading within 28 days, but he could not add new claims or parties without court permission or the consent of Smith and Sonoma County.