D.R. v. Contra Costa County CA

Background

D.R. was born on June 22, 2018. The complaint alleged that two Contra Costa Department of Children and Family Services social workers took D.R. from a hospital on June 25, 2018, without a warrant, after learning that Ramirez had tested positive for drugs. The complaint alleged that D.R. was healthy and showed no drug-withdrawal symptoms. The state dependency court later made D.R. a dependent child. Freeman took a drug test during the dependency process, received a positive result for amphetamine, and was told that D.R. would not be placed with him or other relatives.

The County’s child-services department placed D.R. with Marcie Franich and her husband as foster parents. D.R. died at their residence on October 27, 2018. The complaint alleged that Franich tightly swaddled D.R., placed her unsupervised in a DockATot in a crib or bassinet, and later found her facedown and unresponsive. It also alleged that Mizel did not provide the parents details about the death, directed D.R.’s cremation while falsely claiming to be next of kin, and that the County did not provide the parents with the coroner’s report until later.

Claims and legal standard

The First Amended Complaint asserted five claims against the County Defendants: three claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal civil-rights statute, and two state-law claims. The § 1983 claims alleged judicial deception and concealment of evidence, seizure without a warrant and interference with family relationships, and failure to protect. The state-law claims alleged wrongful death and survivor liability, and negligence involving D.R.’s remains and emotional distress.

The County Defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint states a legally valid claim with enough factual allegations to make relief plausible. The court accepted the complaint’s material factual allegations as true for this motion but did not accept unsupported legal conclusions as facts.

Court’s analysis

First Cause of Action: wrongful death and survivor action. The court dismissed this claim. Ramirez did not present her claim to the County within the six-month period required by California law for a death claim against a public entity, and the complaint did not allege facts supporting an exception. Freeman and the Estate of D.R. presented a claim within six months of D.R.’s death, but the court held that their lawsuit was filed more than six months after notice that the original claim had been denied. Later amended claims did not restart that deadline. The court noted that this ruling did not apply to Franich, who had not appeared in the action.

Second Cause of Action: negligence involving D.R.’s remains and emotional distress. The court dismissed this claim to the extent it was brought on behalf of Freeman and D.R. for the reasons stated regarding the untimely claim. The court did not dismiss Ramirez’s claim because it concerned events occurring after D.R.’s death, and the complaint did not state when those events occurred. The County Defendants had not shown on the pleadings that Ramirez’s claim was untimely.

Third Cause of Action: § 1983 claims. The court dismissed Count One, which alleged judicial deception and concealment of evidence. The allegations did not show that County employees concealed facts relevant to Freeman’s status as a presumed parent. The allegations about the positive drug test also did not show that County employees falsified or fabricated evidence; Freeman already knew the explanation he had given for the result and could have provided it to the state court. The alleged conspiracy to cover up details of D.R.’s death was not ripe because the case remained pending and Freeman had not yet shown that the alleged conduct would cause him to lose his claims.

The court dismissed Count Two to the extent it was asserted on behalf of Freeman based on D.R.’s seizure. The complaint did not allege that Freeman had parental rights in which the social workers could interfere at the time of the seizure; based on the allegations, he might have been an alleged biological father, who under the cited state law did not have a current interest in the child. The court did not dismiss the seizure claim asserted on behalf of Ramirez and D.R. County Defendants had not presented an argument supporting dismissal of that portion. The court dismissed Count Two to the extent it concerned post-death events because the complaint did not provide facts showing that the Doe defendants engaged in the alleged conduct or agreed with Mizel to violate plaintiffs’ rights.

The court dismissed Count Three, which alleged that County employees failed to protect D.R. and failed to investigate her death. The allegations that employees placed D.R. in an unsafe environment supported, at most, negligence, not the deliberate indifference required for a constitutional claim involving a dependent child in foster care. The alleged failure to investigate D.R.’s death was also not ripe under the theory that it was intended to hinder this lawsuit.

Fourth Cause of Action: municipal liability. The court dismissed the § 1983 claim against the County. A local government can be liable under § 1983 when an unconstitutional action implements an official policy or custom, a theory commonly called municipal liability. Because nearly all of the underlying constitutional claims were dismissed, the related municipal-liability theories failed as well. The remaining seizure claim involving Ramirez and D.R. also did not support the County claim because the complaint alleged a County policy or custom only in conclusory terms and did not provide supporting facts.

Disposition

The order states that the County Defendants’ motion to dismiss was GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The First Cause of Action was dismissed. The Second Cause of Action was dismissed to the extent asserted on behalf of Freeman and D.R. Counts One and Three of the Third Cause of Action were dismissed. Count Two was dismissed to the extent asserted on behalf of Freeman and to the extent based on events after D.R.’s death. The Fourth Cause of Action was dismissed. In all other respects, the motion was denied. Plaintiffs were given leave to file a Second Amended Complaint by October 2, 2020, and the case-management conference was continued.