D.R. v. Contra Costa County CA

Background

D.R. was born on June 22, 2018. After a hospital reported methamphetamine in the blood tests of Ramirez and D.R., social workers requested a hold preventing D.R. from leaving the hospital. On June 25, 2018, two Contra Costa County Department of Children and Family Services social workers allegedly took D.R. from the hospital without a warrant. A state dependency court later found D.R. dependent and she was placed with foster mother Marcie Franich.

D.R. died at Franich’s home on October 27, 2018. The complaint alleged that Franich tightly swaddled D.R. and placed her unsupervised in a DockATot, where she was later found facedown and unresponsive. The coroner’s report listed probable cardiac rhythm disorder as the cause of death but also described internal bleeding, bruising to internal organs, and bruising on the back of D.R.’s head. The complaint further alleged that DCFS social worker Tasha Mizel directed D.R.’s cremation and did not provide Freeman with details of the death or the autopsy report for several months.

Plaintiffs asserted claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal civil-rights statute, and state-law claims for wrongful death, negligence, and related harms. They also asserted claims against the County based on alleged municipal policies or customs under Monell v. Department of Social Services. The County Defendants moved to dismiss the Third Amended Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint contains enough factual allegations to state a plausible legal claim.

Rulings on the State-Law Claims

The First Cause of Action was titled “Wrongful Death and Survivor Action” and contained two counts. Count 1 concerned allegations that coroner employees did not adequately investigate D.R.’s death or follow required autopsy procedures. The court dismissed Count 1 to the extent Freeman asserted it because he filed the lawsuit after the applicable filing period and the Third Amended Complaint added no facts supporting an exception. The court denied dismissal of Count 1 to the extent Ramirez asserted it because the County Defendants had not addressed or shown that her equitable-estoppel allegations were insufficient.

Count 2 of the First Cause of Action alleged that DCFS employees and the County failed to place D.R. in the most appropriate home, failed to give relatives preferential consideration and assistance, and failed to protect D.R.’s health and safety. It also alleged that the County was responsible for Franich’s negligence. The court denied dismissal of Count 2 to the extent Ramirez asserted it because the County Defendants had not shown that her equitable-estoppel allegations were insufficient.

The Second Cause of Action concerned alleged interference with D.R.’s remains, including allegations that Mizel falsely claimed to be next of kin, prevented the parents and relatives from making funeral decisions, and prevented a second autopsy. The court denied dismissal of this cause of action to the extent Ramirez asserted it. The court dismissed it to the extent D.R. asserted it because the claim was barred by the applicable filing period and the Third Amended Complaint did not allege facts supporting an exception.

Rulings on the Section 1983 Claims

The Third Cause of Action contained four counts under § 1983.

Count 1: Judicial Deception and Concealment of Evidence. The court dismissed Count 1 in full. The alleged obstruction of Freeman’s paternity claim did not state a claim because the complaint did not allege that a DCFS employee knew of and withheld facts that could have established Freeman as a legally presumed parent. The alleged concealment of relatives’ willingness to accept custody also failed because the complaint stated that Freeman and other relatives expressed that willingness at the dependency hearing. The alleged cover-up of D.R.’s death was dismissed because plaintiffs did not identify a claim that any plaintiff had failed to win as a result of the alleged cover-up, making that theory premature under the court’s reasoning.

Count 2: Seizure Without a Warrant and Interference with Familial Relationship. The court dismissed Count 2 to the extent Freeman asserted it, but denied dismissal in other respects. The court concluded that Freeman had not alleged custody or visitation rights at the time of the seizure and therefore had not alleged the required liberty interest in the parent-child relationship. The court held that the County Defendants had not shown that D.R.’s own warrantless-seizure claim could not proceed because a § 1983 plaintiff may recover nominal damages even without alleged economic loss. The court also held that the County Defendants had not shown that Ramirez lacked a liberty interest in the seizure claim. As to the alleged authorization of D.R.’s cremation by Mizel’s unnamed supervisors, the court dismissed the claim as asserted by Freeman but not as asserted by Ramirez.

Count 3: Failure to Protect. The court dismissed Count 3 in full. The complaint alleged that Mizel and unnamed DCFS employees placed D.R. in an unsafe foster home and failed to investigate her death. The court found that the allegations about placement and supervision supported, at most, negligence, not the deliberate indifference required for a constitutional claim involving a dependent child’s safety. The court also dismissed the investigation theory because plaintiffs again did not identify a claim that D.R. had failed to win as a result of the alleged conspiracy to conceal the cause of death.

Count 4: Obstruction of Relative Placement. The court denied the County Defendants’ jurisdictional arguments and therefore did not dismiss Count 4. The court held that the domestic-relations exception did not apply because plaintiffs were not asking the federal court to issue a custody decree. The court also held that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which generally prevents a federal district court from reviewing a state-court judgment, did not apply because the claim challenged the alleged failure to assist relatives before the state court rather than asking the federal court to review or overturn the custody decision. The County Defendants had not argued that Count 4 otherwise failed to state a claim.

Monell Claims and Disposition

The Fourth Cause of Action asserted Monell claims against the County based on the alleged constitutional violations in Counts 1, 2, and 3 of the Third Cause of Action. The court dismissed the Fourth Cause of Action. It reasoned that the complaint did not adequately plead a County policy or custom supporting liability for the warrantless seizure, and it contained no allegations that the authorization of cremation was given under a municipal policy or custom. The court also noted that a municipality generally cannot be liable under § 1983 without an adequately pleaded constitutional violation.

The court’s final disposition was to grant in part and deny in part the County Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Specifically, it dismissed Count 1 of the First Cause of Action to the extent asserted by Freeman; dismissed the Second Cause of Action to the extent asserted by D.R.; dismissed Count 1 of the Third Cause of Action; dismissed Count 2 of the Third Cause of Action to the extent brought by Freeman; dismissed Count 3 of the Third Cause of Action; and dismissed the Fourth Cause of Action. In all other respects, the motion was denied. Judge Maxine M. Chesney signed the order.