Gardner v. Starkist Co.

Background

Purchasers of StarKist tuna from various states brought this class action, alleging that StarKist’s promises that its tuna products were dolphin-safe and sustainably sourced were false and misleading. StarKist moved to deny class certification before the scheduled completion of class discovery. The court vacated the hearing and decided the motion without oral argument.

The case’s discovery schedule provided for substantial completion of document production related to non-expert class discovery by December 31, 2020, completion of non-expert factual and third-party discovery by March 3, 2021, and filing of the plaintiffs’ class-certification motion and related expert materials by June 4, 2021. The plaintiffs represented that StarKist had not produced discovery and had objected to every request.

Legal standard

Before certifying a class, a court must conduct a rigorous analysis of whether the proposed class satisfies Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. Rule 23(b)(3) requires that common legal or factual questions predominate over individual questions and that a class action be superior to other methods of resolving the dispute. Rule 23(b)(2) permits a class when the opposing party acted on grounds generally applicable to the class and classwide injunctive or declaratory relief is appropriate.

The court explained that a defendant may file an early motion to deny class certification, but such motions are disfavored and may be denied as premature. Courts have discretion to control the class-certification process, and discovery may be necessary to determine whether class treatment is appropriate.

Discussion

Non-label representations and predominance

StarKist argued that the plaintiffs’ theory depended on class members having seen a small number of non-label statements on StarKist’s website, social media, or in press releases. It contended that this would require individualized proof of what each consumer saw and would prevent common issues from predominating.

The plaintiffs responded that the case primarily concerned the meaning of the “dolphin-safe” label on StarKist’s packaging. They said they intended to show that a reasonable consumer would understand the label to mean that StarKist did not kill or harm dolphins, and that the label was deceptive because StarKist used fishing methods known to kill or harm dolphins. They argued that the non-label statements could help show StarKist’s intended message but were not required to prove their false-advertising claims.

The court found that the parties were arguing from different understandings of what the predominance analysis would require. Without more discovery, the court could not decide whether the plaintiffs’ class claims would necessarily fail. It held that the plaintiffs should have a fair opportunity to gather evidence supporting their theories. StarKist’s motion based on potential predominance problems was denied.

Nationwide unjust-enrichment class

The plaintiffs sought to represent a nationwide class of people who purchased the tuna products in the United States during the relevant limitations period. Their claims included unjust enrichment and alleged violations of the unfair-competition laws of several states.

StarKist argued that the nationwide unjust-enrichment class could not satisfy Rule 23(b)(3) because California law could not constitutionally be applied to the entire class and the laws of all fifty states would need to be considered. Under California’s choice-of-law rules, the plaintiffs initially had to show significant contacts or a significant aggregation of contacts between California and the class members’ claims. StarKist would then have to show that the law of another state should apply.

The plaintiffs identified alleged California contacts, including marketing, tuna canning by a wholly owned subsidiary incorporated in California, and labeling at a facility in Eastvale, California. StarKist submitted evidence challenging some of those allegations and argued that the contacts were insufficient. The court declined to conduct the fact-intensive choice-of-law analysis at this stage because the plaintiffs had not yet had discovery concerning the nature and amount of the alleged misconduct in California.

The court also explained that even if the plaintiffs failed to make an initial showing of sufficient California contacts, that would not automatically require denial of the nationwide class. The remaining parts of the governmental-interest analysis would require factual development. StarKist’s motion to deny certification of the nationwide unjust-enrichment class was denied.

Declaratory and injunctive relief class

StarKist argued that the plaintiffs could not certify a class under Rule 23(b)(2) because they primarily sought money damages, restitution, or disgorgement, while their requests for declaratory and injunctive relief were vague. The court found this argument premature because the plaintiffs had not completed expert analysis concerning economic harm and remedies and had not decided which classes they would ultimately seek to certify.

Without a developed record, the court could not conclude that the plaintiffs would be unable to satisfy Rule 23(b)(2). StarKist’s motion on this basis was denied.

Disposition

The court denied without prejudice StarKist’s motion to deny class certification. StarKist remained able to raise the arguments presented in the motion at a later stage of the proceedings.