Santiago v. Brennan

Background

Willie Romero Santiago sued Louis DeJoy, the United States Postmaster General, over events during Santiago’s employment with the United States Postal Service. Santiago alleged that conduct involving his work assignments, treatment during training, alleged retaliation, a disability-accommodation referral, probation, a termination threat, and a notice of separation was based on his age and national origin. He identified claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the California Fair Employment and Housing Act, the No FEAR Act, the “Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972,” and the First Amendment. The opinion notes that Santiago had previously voluntarily dismissed his First Amendment claim but referred to it again in his amended complaint.

Santiago’s amended complaint referred to the USPS-SF District and postal officers Khamkhit Sondara and Cizhen Zhu, while the caption named DeJoy. DeJoy moved to dismiss under Rules 8, 10, 12(b)(1), and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Santiago represented himself and filed a one-page response that did not address the motion’s arguments.

Court’s analysis

The court first ruled that it lacked jurisdiction over Santiago’s request for punitive damages because the federal government had not waived its sovereign immunity for such damages. The court stated that punitive damages are unavailable under the ADEA and are unavailable against a federal government employer under Title VII. Because punitive damages were the only relief Santiago sought, the court granted the motion on that ground.

The court also agreed that the amended complaint did not satisfy Rules 8 and 10. It did not clearly identify which defendant was sued for each claim, separate the legal theories and factual allegations, or provide organized facts supporting each alleged violation. The court directed that any new complaint identify the defendants responsible for each claim, separate each legal theory into its own claim, and state the supporting facts clearly.

Under Rule 12(b)(6), which permits dismissal for failure to state a legally sufficient claim, the court found that Santiago had not alleged enough facts to support discrimination, hostile-work-environment, or retaliation claims under Title VII or the ADEA. The discrimination allegations were conclusory and did not plausibly connect the alleged employment actions to age or national-origin discrimination. The harassment allegations did not describe the conduct, show that it was based on a protected category, or link it to a particular defendant. The retaliation allegations did not explain what Santiago reported, whether the report concerned discrimination covered by Title VII or the ADEA, or what retaliatory measures were taken.

The court dismissed the FEHA theory with prejudice, meaning that theory could not be pursued in this action, because Title VII and the ADEA provide the exclusive judicial remedies for race and age discrimination in federal employment. It dismissed the No FEAR Act theory without permission to amend because the statute does not provide a private right of action. It also dismissed the separate “Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972” theory without permission to amend because the statute is an amendment to Title VII rather than a separate legal theory. The court stated that any First Amendment claim would need to identify separate conduct and a specific constitutional violation.

Finally, the court ruled that Santiago had not alleged exhaustion of the required administrative process for federal-employee Title VII claims. Any amended complaint had to identify the claims included in his administrative complaint and state whether he exhausted those remedies or had a legal basis excusing exhaustion.

Disposition

The court granted DeJoy’s motion to dismiss the amended complaint with leave to amend. Santiago was permitted to file a second amended complaint containing additional allegations addressing the identified defects. He could not add new legal theories or parties without the court’s permission or the defendant’s agreement, and he was not to include theories dismissed without permission to amend. The court set November 20, 2020, as the filing deadline and stated that the defendant would have 21 days afterward to respond.