Chinonye Ugorji v. County of Lake

Background

Chinonye Ugorji alleged that she was formerly employed by the County of Lake as a misdemeanor prosecutor in the County District Attorney’s office. She sued the County, Trang Jensen, Nicholas Rotow, and unidentified defendants. Her complaint alleged that defendants violated her civil rights under federal and California law, defamed her, failed to pay minimum wage, failed to reimburse work expenses, and failed to provide personnel records after her termination.

The complaint asserted seven causes of action: an Equal Protection claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Jensen; discriminatory termination claims under Title VII and the California Fair Employment and Housing Act against the County; a California claim for failing to prevent discrimination; defamation claims against the County and Rotow; a California minimum-wage claim; a California Labor Code section 2802 expense-reimbursement claim; and a California Labor Code section 1198.5 personnel-records claim.

Motion to Strike Under California’s Anti-SLAPP Law

The defendants moved to strike the defamation claim under California’s anti-SLAPP statute. Anti-SLAPP law provides a procedure for striking claims arising from protected speech or petitioning activity unless the plaintiff shows a probability of success. The court applied a two-step test: first, whether the challenged conduct was protected activity; and second, whether the plaintiff stated a legally sufficient claim.

The court found that Rotow’s alleged statement to a judge that Ugorji “would not have to put up with [her] much longer” was protected because it was made before a judicial proceeding. The court rejected the defendants’ arguments that the other alleged statements were protected because they related to issues in criminal proceedings or concerned the functioning of government. The court concluded that the other statements involved private disparagement of one prosecutor and did not contribute to a public discussion.

Applying the pleading standard to the protected statement, the court concluded that the statement was neither false nor disparaging in context and that the allegations did not provide a sufficient factual basis for the inference that Rotow had defamed Ugorji in the judge’s chambers. The court therefore struck the quoted allegation concerning that statement. It denied the remainder of the motion to strike.

Motion to Dismiss

The defendants also moved to dismiss every claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which permits dismissal when a complaint does not state a legally sufficient claim.

For the discrimination claims, the court held that Ugorji adequately alleged that she was treated differently from a white coworker who received training, that she was terminated while the coworker remained employed, and that she had performed her job competently. The court found that discriminatory intent could be inferred from those allegations and declined to decide at the dismissal stage whether the defendants’ asserted incompetence explanation was a pretext.

The court also declined to dismiss the claim that the County failed to prevent discrimination under California law. It found sufficient the allegations that a coworker warned District Attorney Susan Krones about Ugorji’s treatment and warned against terminating the only person of color in the office, but that Krones terminated her anyway.

The court declined to dismiss the remaining defamation claim based on vagueness or opinion. It found that the allegations identified particular statements, speakers, recipients, and dates sufficiently to give defendants notice, and that the statement about not learning from Ugorji because it would “likely be wrong” could imply a provably false statement of fact. The court also rejected, at the dismissal stage, defendants’ arguments based on the judicial-proceeding privilege, common-interest privilege, and prosecutorial immunity.

The court declined to dismiss the minimum-wage claim. It rejected the defendants’ argument that Ugorji was exempt as a professional employee because the complaint alleged that she was paid hourly and that her pay could be reduced based on the amount of time worked. The court also rejected the defendants’ argument that the alleged hours could not result in a minimum-wage violation under California law.

The court declined to dismiss the expense-reimbursement claim because Ugorji adequately alleged that cellphone use was necessary for contacting witnesses, law-enforcement officers, and supervisors outside working hours. The court also declined to dismiss the personnel-records claim, finding that whether the allegedly missing positive evaluation existed was a factual dispute not properly resolved on a motion to dismiss.

Disposition

Judge Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss. She granted in part and denied in part the defendants’ motion to strike, striking the specified allegation about Rotow’s statement to the judge and denying the remainder of that motion. The order terminated Docket Numbers 16 and 18.