Smith v. County of Santa Cruz

Background

David R. Smith, proceeding without a lawyer, owns multiple parcels in Santa Cruz County. The dispute concerned alleged land-use violations involving an illegal sawmill and lumber storage operation. County officials posted notices and issued administrative citations concerning Parcel 10. Smith alleged that the initial notice and three citations were posted to the wrong property, because the sawmill operation was on Parcel 51.

After an administrative hearing on November 22, 2019, hearing officer Bryan Hackett found that Smith knowingly and willfully violated the Santa Cruz County Code. Smith was ordered to pay $1,700 in citation penalties, $560 in enforcement and abatement costs, and $2,750 in civil penalties. The decision became final on January 14, 2020. A later enforcement matter concerning Parcel 51 resulted in a February 21, 2020 decision by hearing officer John McSpadden.

Smith filed an amended complaint asserting ten causes of action against the County, hearing officers Hackett and McSpadden, county officials and employees Marcus Mendez, Matt Johnston, Bruce McPherson, and Virginia Johnson. The claims included equal protection, excessive fines, separation of powers, substantive and procedural due process, a claim under California’s Bane Act, retaliatory prosecution, petitions for administrative writs, and a request for civil sanctions based on alleged perjury.

Rulings on Hackett-related claims

The court held that Hackett served in a quasi-judicial role as an administrative hearing officer. Because his functions included conducting hearings, receiving evidence, ruling on legal and evidentiary questions, preparing the record, and issuing enforcement orders, the court held that he was entitled to quasi-judicial immunity. Claims one, two, and four against Hackett were dismissed with prejudice.

The court also dismissed Smith’s Bane Act claim against Hackett with prejudice. The court explained that Smith had not alleged threats, intimidation, or coercion leading to violence, which the court identified as required for the claim.

Smith’s writ claim concerning Hackett’s January 14, 2020 decision was dismissed with prejudice as untimely. The court stated that Smith had 90 days after the decision became final to file the petition and that he did not file it until May 14, 2020.

The court dismissed claim nine against Hackett without prejudice because it declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over that combined writ claim rather than separately deciding Hackett’s statute-of-limitations defense.

Rulings on the County Defendants’ claims

The court dismissed the equal-protection claim with prejudice. Smith alleged that he was treated differently from a property owner who had been given five years to clean up a vehicle-storage yard, while he was given three months to address his sawmill-related materials. The court found that the two operations were not sufficiently comparable, in part because of the potential difference in fire hazards.

The court dismissed the excessive-fines claim with prejudice. Smith clarified that he was challenging the $1,700 in citation penalties. The court held that he should have challenged those penalties through the available state-law review procedures within the required 90-day period, but did not do so. The court therefore treated the administrative decision and penalties as final.

The court dismissed the separation-of-powers claim with prejudice. It concluded that Smith had not alleged sufficient facts showing that McPherson, Johnson, or the other County Defendants violated the California Constitution by encouraging enforcement of the County Code.

The court dismissed the due-process claim with prejudice. For procedural due process, the court held that Smith had not timely used available state remedies. For substantive due process, the court found that the alleged conduct did not rise to the level of conduct that shocks the conscience or constitutes a true abuse of power, and that Smith had not shown amendment could cure the deficiencies.

The court dismissed the Bane Act claim against the County Defendants with prejudice because Smith had not alleged facts suggesting violence or threats of violence. It also dismissed the retaliatory-prosecution claim with prejudice. The court found that Smith had not adequately alleged retaliatory motive as the necessary cause of the enforcement action and described the claim as implausible.

The court dismissed the writ claim concerning Hackett’s January 14 decision with prejudice because it was time barred. It dismissed the writ claims concerning McSpadden’s decision and the combined administrative enforcement matters without prejudice after declining supplemental jurisdiction. The court cited the complexity and predominance of the state-law issues, the absence of remaining federal claims, and the parallel state-court proceeding.

Finally, the court dismissed the perjury claim with prejudice. It held that the federal criminal perjury statute does not create a private civil cause of action and applied that conclusion to McSpadden as well.

Rulings on McSpadden-related claims and final disposition

Although counsel’s limited representation for McSpadden concerned only claims eight and nine, the court addressed Smith’s equal-protection and excessive-fines claims against McSpadden. It dismissed the equal-protection claim because it failed to state a claim, and dismissed the excessive-fines claim with prejudice because the February 21, 2020 decision did not impose monetary penalties and Smith had not adequately pleaded the claim. Claims eight and nine against McSpadden were dismissed without prejudice so they could be litigated in state court.

Judge Beth Labson Freeman ordered that the motions to dismiss filed at ECF Nos. 13, 26, and 49 were granted. Claims one, two, three, four, five, six, seven, and ten were dismissed with prejudice. Claims eight and nine were dismissed without prejudice to allow litigation in state court.