Saddozai v. Atchley
- Beth Freeman
- 5:20-cv-07534
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 13
In Saddozai v. Atchley, Judge Freeman dismissed two claims with prejudice, kept one claim, and denied three other motions in different ways.
Shikeb Saddozai and S. Tomlinson; two claims were dismissed with prejudice, while Saddozai’s First Amendment claim continued and he could submit a supplemental complaint concerning proposed new defendants.
What happened
In Saddozai v. Atchley, Shikeb Saddozai, a state prisoner representing himself, sued prison defendants under a federal civil-rights law. The court had previously allowed three claims against S. Tomlinson to proceed: a free-speech claim, an excessive-force claim, and a claim concerning withheld legal papers.
The court granted Tomlinson’s motion to dismiss the excessive-force and due-process claims for failure to state a claim and dismissed both claims with prejudice. The free-speech claim remained. The court denied Saddozai’s motion to correct a claim as moot, denied his motion to add defendants without prejudice while allowing a supplemental complaint, and denied his motion seeking a court order.
Judge Beth Labson Freeman set deadlines for further briefing on the remaining claim, including a deadline for Tomlinson to seek summary judgment. The case therefore continued only on Saddozai’s free-speech claim against Tomlinson.
The detailed version
- Saddozai v. Atchley · No. 5:20-cv-07534
- Beth Freeman
- Aug. 25, 2023
Background
Shikeb Saddozai, a state prisoner proceeding without a lawyer, brought a civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against defendants at Salinas Valley State Prison. The operative pleading was his third amended complaint. The court had previously found three claims sufficient to proceed against S. Tomlinson:
- A First Amendment freedom-of-speech claim based on removing Saddozai from the prison library after he complained.
- An Eighth Amendment excessive-force claim based on a supervisor-liability theory concerning painful handcuffing.
- A Fourteenth Amendment due-process claim based on reading Saddozai’s confidential legal documents and withholding the originals and copies without a written explanation.
Tomlinson moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which allows dismissal when a complaint does not state a legally sufficient claim. Saddozai opposed the motion. Saddozai also moved to correct an error in one claim, to add sixteen defendants, and for a court order concerning alleged withholding of legal mail.
Excessive-force claim
Saddozai alleged that he was removed from the library in painful handcuffs and that Tomlinson was in a supervisory position when officers used excessive force under her direction. Tomlinson argued that Saddozai alleged only that she sounded an alarm and did not allege that she directed, participated in, or had authority over the officers’ actions.
The court found that the complaint did not state an excessive-force claim against Tomlinson based on supervisory liability. It noted that the only allegation was that Tomlinson sounded the alarm, with no allegation that she instructed the officers how to act or had authority to do so. The court also noted that Saddozai did not respond to Tomlinson’s argument about the lack of a supervisory basis. The court granted dismissal of this claim and stated in the discussion that dismissal was without leave to amend. The conclusion expressly stated that the claim was dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim.
Due-process claim
Saddozai alleged that Tomlinson read his confidential legal papers and kept the original petition and copies. The court considered whether the alleged confiscation involved a protected liberty or property interest. It held that the allegations did not establish a protected liberty interest sufficient to support a procedural due-process claim. It also held that, because the alleged confiscation was unauthorized and California provided an adequate state post-deprivation remedy, the property-related claim could not proceed under § 1983.
The court separately held that Saddozai could not base a due-process claim on the handling of his prison grievance. According to the court, the prison regulations created a procedural right to have a prison appeal, but did not create a protected liberty interest. The court therefore granted dismissal of the due-process claim. The discussion stated that dismissal was without leave to amend, and the conclusion expressly stated that the claim was dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim.
Other motions
The court denied as moot Saddozai’s motion to correct an error in his claim because the proposed facts did not establish a viable due-process claim.
The court construed Saddozai’s motion to add sixteen defendants as a request for leave to file an amended complaint. It denied that motion without prejudice because Saddozai’s allegations were generalized and did not identify the constitutional right allegedly violated, the injury caused, or each proposed defendant’s individual involvement. The court granted leave to file a supplemental complaint within twenty-eight days alleging sufficient facts and complying with the federal rules governing the joining of claims and parties. The court advised that the only existing claim was the First Amendment claim against Tomlinson and that any new claims and defendants would have to be properly related to that claim.
The court denied Saddozai’s motion seeking an order requiring correctional authorities or defense counsel to address alleged withholding of legal mail. The court found that the attached materials did not support the alleged specific incident involving Saddozai’s mail.
Disposition and next steps
The court granted Tomlinson’s motion to dismiss claims two and three. The excessive-force and due-process claims were dismissed with prejudice, and the action proceeded solely on the remaining First Amendment claim. The court ordered Tomlinson to file any summary-judgment motion on that claim no later than fifty-six days after the order was filed. It also set deadlines for Saddozai’s opposition and Tomlinson’s reply and stated that the existing briefing provisions otherwise remained in effect.
Judge Beth Labson Freeman’s order terminated the docket entries concerning Tomlinson’s dismissal motion and Saddozai’s three other motions.
Read the full 13-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.