Raymond D. v. Saul

Background

Raymond D. sought judicial review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) of the Commissioner of Social Security’s final decision denying his claim for disability insurance benefits. He filed his claim in March 2017 and later amended his alleged disability-onset date to March 15, 2017. An Administrative Law Judge held a hearing and found that Raymond D. was not disabled.

The Administrative Law Judge found severe impairments including bipolar disorder, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, and cannabis, opioid, and stimulant use disorders. She determined that Raymond D. could perform a full range of work at all exertional levels, subject to limits requiring simple, routine tasks and routine, superficial contact with others. She found that he could perform past work as a courtesy clerk and could also perform other jobs identified by a vocational expert, including motor-vehicle assembler, day worker, and cleaner II.

Issues and Analysis

Raymond D. challenged the Administrative Law Judge’s evaluation of the medical evidence, his testimony, the disability listings, the finding that he had past relevant work, and his residual functional capacity. Residual functional capacity means the most a person can still do despite medically supported limitations.

The court held that the Administrative Law Judge did not provide specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence for partially rejecting the opinions of examining psychologists Lesleigh Franklin and Elizabeth Walser. Those psychologists identified marked limitations in completing a normal workday and workweek, maintaining regular attendance, responding to workplace changes, handling stress, and interacting with others, as well as an extreme limitation in accepting instructions and responding to criticism from supervisors.

The Administrative Law Judge had stated that the psychologists did not explain these limitations and that the limitations were inconsistent with Raymond D.’s testimony and independent activities. The court found that explanation insufficiently detailed. The psychologists’ report described problems with memory, attention, impulse control, behavioral regulation, following rules, managing basic needs, obtaining treatment, managing money, and living independently. The court also noted that much of Raymond D.’s treatment occurred during incarceration, where structured and supportive conditions did not necessarily show that he could function in a regular workplace.

The court also held that the Administrative Law Judge did not adequately support giving great weight to the opinions of the state-agency consultants. The decision did not explain what evidence supported those opinions or discuss the relevant factors of supportability, consistency, and specialization. The court further stated that the consultants’ familiarity with Social Security disability programs was not, by itself, a sufficient reason to favor their opinions over those of examining psychologists.

The court found a separate error at step four of the disability analysis. The Administrative Law Judge treated Raymond D.’s courtesy-clerk work at Safeway in 2000 and 2001 as past relevant work, but the regulations define past relevant work as work performed within the previous 15 years, among other requirements. The court found that this job was outside that 15-year period. The court did not decide whether the Administrative Law Judge’s alternative step-five analysis was correct because that analysis depended substantially on the evaluation of the medical opinions, which had to be reconsidered.

The court likewise declined to resolve Raymond D.’s challenges to the evaluation of his testimony, the disability listings, and his residual functional capacity because those issues could be affected by the required reconsideration of the medical opinions.

Disposition

Judge Thomas S. Hixson granted Raymond D.’s motion for summary judgment, denied the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment, and reversed the Administrative Law Judge’s decision. The court remanded the case for further administrative proceedings consistent with the order. It did not order an immediate award of benefits because, although the record showed errors requiring further review, it was not clear that the Administrative Law Judge would be required to find Raymond D. disabled after that review. The court stated that a separate judgment would be entered and the case would then be terminated by the clerk.