Donna M. v. Andrew M. Saul

Background

The Social Security Administration found Donna M. disabled beginning January 1, 2003, based on an anxiety disorder that met a listed impairment. In 2013, the agency determined that she was no longer disabled because of medical improvement and terminated her disability benefits. After additional administrative proceedings, an administrative law judge again found that her disability ended on July 17, 2013 and that she had not become disabled again before March 31, 2016, her last-insured date.

The administrative law judge found that Donna M. had depressive disorder and anxiety disorder. He determined that she could perform work at all exertional levels if limited to simple, routine tasks with no public interaction. Relying on vocational-expert testimony, he concluded that these limitations would not significantly reduce the available unskilled jobs.

Arguments and review standard

Donna M. moved for summary judgment, asking the court to reverse the Commissioner’s decision. The Commissioner cross-moved for summary judgment, asking the court to affirm it. Donna M. argued that the administrative law judge improperly weighed medical opinions, assessed her credibility, and rejected lay-witness testimony. The court reviewed whether the decision was based on legal error or supported by substantial evidence, meaning evidence that could lead a reasonable person to accept the conclusion.

Court’s analysis

The court held that the administrative law judge’s residual functional capacity assessment did not account for all of the limitations identified by examining psychologist Elizabeth A. Whelchel, Ph.D. Although the assessment addressed concentration, attention, persistence, pace, and interaction with the public, it did not address limitations involving interaction with coworkers, maintaining regular attendance, performing work consistently, associating with day-to-day work activity, and working without special or additional supervision.

The court also held that the hypothetical question posed to the vocational expert omitted limitations that the administrative law judge had accepted from Dr. Whelchel, medical expert Steven Sutherland, Ph.D., and state-agency medical consultants. Because the hypothetical did not include all of Donna M.’s limitations, the vocational expert’s testimony could not support the decision.

The court further held that the administrative law judge did not adequately explain why he rejected part of Dr. Sutherland’s opinion. Dr. Sutherland had opined that Donna M. had marked social limitations, might have difficulty maintaining work, and could miss work two or three times per month or lose work during episodes of anger. The administrative law judge characterized this portion of the opinion as based on a limited perception during the hearing and unsupported by the objective record, but did not identify a specific part of the medical evidence that contradicted it.

Because Dr. Sutherland’s opinion could have affected the finding of medical improvement, the court also directed the administrative law judge to reevaluate treating psychiatrist Joanne Markle, M.D.’s opinion. Dr. Markle’s opinions about social functioning were consistent with the portions of Dr. Sutherland’s opinion that the administrative law judge had improperly rejected.

Disposition

Judge Donna M. Ryu granted Donna M.’s motion for summary judgment in part, denied the Commissioner’s motion, and remanded the matter for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. The court did not address Donna M.’s remaining claims of error because the errors concerning the medical opinions were sufficient to require remand.