Simmons v. Marriot Court Yard

Background

Dawnia Simmons filed the complaint without a lawyer. The complaint lists three claims: defamation of character, discrimination, and retaliation. Simmons alleged that she worked for Marriott Courtyard in 2017, complained about not receiving a raise and about how she was treated, and resigned in 2018. She further alleged that, when potential employers contacted Marriott for references, Marriott employees falsely said that she had been fired. Simmons claimed that this prevented her from obtaining employment at another hotel and caused her depression. The complaint also alleged that Marriott refused to provide her resignation letter until someone at the NAACP contacted a general manager.

The complaint names the defendant as “Marriot Court Yard.” The opinion states in a footnote that the defendant is actually Courtyard Management Corporation and was erroneously named in the complaint as “Marriot Court Yard.” The court also refers to the defendant as “Marriott.”

Legal standard

The defendant moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint states a legally recognized claim supported by enough factual allegations. In the alternative, the defendant sought a more definite statement for the discrimination and retaliation claims.

At this stage, the court generally accepts factual allegations as true but does not have to accept unsupported legal conclusions. A complaint must allege enough facts to make the claimed entitlement to relief plausible.

Defamation claim

The court held that Simmons alleged enough facts to state a defamation claim. The alleged false statement was that Simmons had been fired when she had actually resigned. The alleged publication occurred when potential employers contacted Marriott and were told that Simmons had been fired. The court found that Simmons sufficiently alleged injury and causation because she claimed that she could not obtain hotel employment after potential employers received the allegedly false information.

The court therefore denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss the first claim.

Discrimination and retaliation claims

Although Simmons did not identify a statute, the court construed her discrimination and retaliation claims as claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits certain employment discrimination and retaliation.

The defendant argued that Simmons had not alleged that she filed the required administrative charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission or a state agency. The complaint did not state whether Simmons had exhausted those administrative procedures, whether she received a notice permitting her to sue, or when she received such a notice. Simmons referred in her opposition brief to contact with the California Department of Industrial Relations’ complaint investigation unit and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, but the court explained that factual allegations generally must appear in the complaint rather than only in an opposition brief.

The court concluded that Simmons had not alleged facts showing exhaustion of her administrative remedies. However, the court determined that her statements suggested she could add facts in an amended complaint. It therefore found that amendment should be allowed and stated that any amended complaint also needed to plausibly allege all elements of the discrimination and retaliation claims.

The court granted the motion to dismiss the second and third claims, and those claims were dismissed with leave to amend.

Disposition

The court concluded that the motion to dismiss was granted in part and denied in part. Simmons could file an amended complaint addressing the deficiencies within 30 days of the order. If she did not file one, the case would proceed on the defamation claim. The order also stated that no additional claims or parties could be added without the defendant’s consent or the court’s permission.