Safapou v. Rushmore Loan Management, LLC
- Jacquelyn Corley
- 3:19-cv-04623
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 3
In Safapou v. Rushmore, Judge Corley granted Safapou’s voluntary dismissal with prejudice and denied defendants’ summary-judgment motion as moot.
Cherie Safapou’s foreclosure action was voluntarily dismissed with prejudice. Rushmore Loan Management LLC and Wilmington Savings Fund Society were affected because their summary-judgment motion was denied as moot.
What happened
In Safapou v. Rushmore Loan Management, LLC, Cherie Safapou brought a foreclosure action against her loan servicer and the loan trustee. After Safapou did not oppose defendants’ summary-judgment motion, the court ordered her to explain the failure.
Safapou then asked to dismiss the case voluntarily, explaining that her intended expert had died and that she could not afford a replacement. The court found that defendants had not shown legal prejudice from the dismissal, but it also found that Safapou had delayed seeking dismissal and that defendants had needlessly prepared their summary-judgment motion.
Judge Jacquelyn Corley granted Safapou’s voluntary dismissal with prejudice. The court denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment as moot.
The detailed version
- Safapou v. Rushmore Loan Management, LLC · No. 3:19-cv-04623
- Jacquelyn Corley
- Dec. 3, 2020
Background
Cherie Safapou brought a foreclosure action against Rushmore Loan Management LLC, her current loan servicer, and Wilmington Savings Fund Society, the loan trustee. Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. Safapou did not file an opposition, so the court issued an order requiring her to explain that failure.
Safapou responded by filing a motion for voluntary dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2). Because defendants’ summary-judgment motion was pending, Safapou needed the court’s approval to dismiss the suit.
Voluntary Dismissal
The court explained that a Rule 41(a)(2) dismissal generally should be granted unless a defendant shows plain legal prejudice. Legal prejudice means harm to a legal interest, legal claim, or legal argument. Defendants did not oppose Safapou’s dismissal motion, and the deadline for doing so had passed. The court therefore found no showing of legal prejudice and granted the request for voluntary dismissal.
The motion did not specify whether the dismissal should be with or without prejudice. In deciding that issue, the court considered defendants’ effort and expense in preparing for trial, any excessive delay or lack of diligence by Safapou, and whether Safapou sufficiently explained the need for dismissal.
Safapou explained that her attorney learned in September 2020 that William Matz, the expert Safapou intended to disclose, had died. Safapou had already paid Matz $4,500, could not afford another expert, and relied on Matz’s accounting review of records. The court found that this explained why Safapou sought dismissal but did not explain why she waited to seek dismissal. She knew of Matz’s death a month before the expert-disclosure and dispositive-motion deadlines, but did not notify defendants of her intent to dismiss until after they filed their summary-judgment motion and after the court addressed her failure to oppose it.
The court concluded that Safapou’s lack of diligence and defendants’ needless work preparing the summary-judgment motion favored dismissal with prejudice.
Disposition
Judge Jacquelyn Scott Corley granted Safapou’s motion for voluntary dismissal with prejudice. The court denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment as moot and stated that the order disposed of Docket Nos. 42 and 48.
Read the full 3-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.