Mora-Albarran v. Mayorkas

Background

Ramon Mora-Albarran sued Alejandro Mayorkas, identified in the opinion as the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, under the Administrative Procedure Act. He challenged the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services’ denial of his application to replace or renew his lawful permanent resident card.

According to the complaint, Mora-Albarran became a lawful permanent resident in 1985. In 1986, while attempting to reenter the United States, immigration officials accused him of marriage fraud and warned him that he could face a lengthy prison term unless he gave up his permanent resident status. He signed a form I-407 abandoning that status, although he alleged that he was not adequately advised about waiving his right to counsel.

Mora-Albarran later applied to replace his permanent resident card. The application was approved, and an agency note stated that his card had been taken without a valid reason. In 2017, he applied to renew the card again, but the agency denied the application based solely on the 1986 I-407 form. He filed this action seeking, among other relief, a ruling that the denial lacked adequate support, an order setting aside the denial and directing approval of his application, a declaration that he remained a lawful permanent resident, and an injunction concerning his treatment as a returning resident.

Events After Filing

After the lawsuit began, the agency vacated the denial, reopened the application, approved it, and issued Mora-Albarran a new permanent resident card. The government then argued that the case was moot, meaning that no live dispute remained for a federal court to decide. The court initially rejected that argument because the government had not shown that the application could not be denied again based on the I-407 form.

The government later submitted a memorandum from the Director of the Potomac Service Center stating that the I-407 form was canceled and would not be considered in future agency decisions. The memorandum was placed in Mora-Albarran’s file, and a copy of the I-407 was marked as canceled. Mora-Albarran’s opposition acknowledged that the agency had canceled the I-407.

Court’s Analysis

The court explained that a defendant’s voluntary cessation of challenged conduct does not ordinarily make a case moot. It can do so, however, when the defendant shows that the violation is not reasonably expected to recur and that the effects of the violation have been completely and permanently eliminated.

The court determined that the agency met that demanding standard. It had reversed the card-application denial, approved the application, canceled the I-407, and expressly stated that the form would not be considered in future agency decisions. The court concluded that these actions eliminated the possibility that the I-407 would again be used to deny Mora-Albarran’s card application for the same reason.

The court also rejected Mora-Albarran’s argument that declaratory and injunctive relief remained necessary because the cancellation memorandum applied only to agency decisions by the immigration service. The court stated that the challenged final agency action was the immigration service’s denial of the application, which had already been reversed. It found no basis to issue relief based on speculation that another agency might later use the canceled document.

Disposition

Judge Corley held that Mora-Albarran’s claims were moot and that the court therefore lacked subject-matter jurisdiction under Article III of the Constitution. The court denied Mora-Albarran’s motion for summary judgment and granted the government’s cross-motion. The clerk was directed to enter judgment by separate order.