Zafarmand v. Pompeo
- Maxine Chesney
- 3:20-cv-00803
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 10
In Zafarmand v. Pompeo, Judge Chesney granted defendants’ dismissal motion and dismissed the amended complaint with prejudice over visa-waiver claims.
The ruling affected the three groups of plaintiffs seeking decisions on visa waivers for Iranian relatives and the federal defendants responsible for the challenged waiver process. It ended the plaintiffs’ amended complaint by dismissing it with prejudice.
What happened
In Zafarmand v. Pompeo, three groups of plaintiffs challenged the government’s alleged failure to decide case-by-case waiver requests for Iranian relatives seeking visas. They alleged that the waiver process improperly involved other officials and contractors and that the government unreasonably delayed decisions.
The court dismissed both claims under the rule requiring a complaint to state a plausible legal claim. It found that the amended complaint did not adequately show improper control over waiver decisions, failure to use automated screening, a continuing processing loop, or an unreasonable delay. The court also found that the plaintiffs had not fixed problems identified in its earlier order.
Judge Maxine M. Chesney granted defendants’ motion to dismiss and dismissed the amended complaint with prejudice. The court gave no further permission to amend either the claim under the Administrative Procedure Act or the claim seeking an order compelling official action.
The detailed version
- Zafarmand v. Pompeo · No. 3:20-cv-00803
- Maxine Chesney
- Dec. 9, 2020
Background
The plaintiffs consisted of three groups: U.S. citizens who submitted visa applications for Iranian siblings or parents; those Iranian family members; and other Iranian relatives. They challenged the alleged withholding of decisions on case-by-case waivers under Presidential Proclamation 9645, which restricts entry by Iranian nationals but allows certain waivers when specified hardship, security, and national-interest conditions are met.
The plaintiffs alleged that their visa applications had been refused under the proclamation and that defendants had not adjudicated waivers for eight beneficiary and derivative plaintiffs. They alleged an average wait of 879 days when they filed their amended complaint. They also alleged that a secret process improperly expanded decision-making authority beyond consular officers, failed to use an enhanced automated screening system, and kept applicants in a continuing cycle of administrative processing.
The amended complaint asserted two claims: one under the Administrative Procedure Act alleging arbitrary and capricious conduct, and one seeking mandamus, an extraordinary court order compelling a federal official to perform a clearly required, nondiscretionary duty.
First Claim: Administrative Procedure Act
The court dismissed the claim to the extent it relied on alleged usurpation of consular authority. The plaintiffs had not shown that the officials and entities they identified were outside the statutory and regulatory definition of “consular officer.” Even assuming some were not consular officers and their concurrence was required, the amended complaint did not clearly explain their roles or show that consular officers lacked final discretion. The court also found that the allegations concerning a Quality Support, Inc. contractor’s email did not make the alleged improper role of contractors plausible.
The court also dismissed the portions of the claim concerning enhanced automated screening and a continuing loop of administrative processing. The proclamation did not require use of an automated system, and the plaintiffs had already attended their interviews. The court found the allegations about a perpetual processing loop conclusory and lacking adequate factual support.
Because the plaintiffs had not cured deficiencies identified in the court’s earlier order, the court dismissed the First Claim for Relief without further leave to amend.
Second Claim: Mandamus
The court dismissed the mandamus claim insofar as it was based on alleged usurpation of consular authority because that theory depended on the deficient Administrative Procedure Act claim. The court also rejected the unreasonable-delay theory. The plaintiffs had not added facts or given another reason to reconsider the earlier finding that they had not shown an unreasonable wait. Although the wait was longer than when the court issued its earlier order, the court noted that courts had generally found delays of four years or less not unreasonable in the immigration context, and the plaintiffs had waited less than three years as of the order.
Because the plaintiffs had not cured the previously identified deficiencies, the court dismissed the Second Claim for Relief without further leave to amend.
Disposition
The court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss and dismissed the First Amended Complaint with prejudice. The opinion therefore disposed of the case through the pleading-stage dismissal rules rather than deciding whether the plaintiffs’ underlying allegations were ultimately proven.
Read the full 10-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.