McDonald v. County of Sonoma

Background

La’Marcus McDonald sued County of Sonoma, Town of Windsor, Sheriff Mark Essick, Deputy Sheriff Travis Perkins, Administrative Sergeant Brent Kidder, and Deputy Gregory Clegg. He alleged that Perkins and Clegg unlawfully arrested, used excessive force against, and searched him in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and the California Constitution. He also alleged that the governments and supervisory officers allowed continuing constitutional violations.

The allegations arose from a July 9, 2019 welfare check. Deputies found McDonald asleep in a legally parked car with the ignition off. After McDonald said he had consumed alcohol, Perkins asked him to leave the car and turn around. The parties disputed what happened next. McDonald alleged that he was complying and that Perkins grabbed him without warning, slammed him headfirst onto the pavement, knocked him unconscious, and broke several teeth. Clegg allegedly witnessed the takedown. The officers searched McDonald and the car, transported McDonald to a hospital and then to jail, and the car was impounded. McDonald alleged that he was not told that he was under arrest or charged with anything, and that he remained in jail until relatives bailed him out.

Legal standard

The defendants asked the court to dismiss several claims under Rule 12(b)(6), which permits dismissal when a complaint does not state a legally sufficient claim. At this stage, the court generally accepts well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draws reasonable inferences for the plaintiff, but it does not accept conclusory allegations or unreasonable inferences.

Rulings on the federal civil-rights claims

The court held that McDonald plausibly alleged a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal law that provides a remedy when a person acting under state authority violates rights secured by federal law.

For the unlawful-arrest claim, the court accepted McDonald’s allegation that he did not resist arrest. On that version of events, Perkins lacked probable cause to arrest him for resisting arrest. The court also rejected the defendants’ argument that the alleged facts established probable cause for public-intoxication disorderly conduct. The court concluded that the facts might support reasonable suspicion for a detention but did not establish probable cause for an arrest.

For excessive force, the court analyzed the claim under the Fourth Amendment. Assuming McDonald’s allegations were true, Perkins slammed a compliant person to the pavement, causing loss of consciousness and broken teeth, even though the alleged offense was not severe, McDonald did not pose a threat, and he denied resisting. The court concluded that McDonald plausibly alleged excessive force.

Because the court found that Perkins lacked probable cause to arrest McDonald, it also concluded that Perkins and Clegg lacked probable cause to search McDonald. The court allowed the § 1983 unlawful-search claim to proceed.

Supervisory and participation claims

The court rejected McDonald’s theories that Sheriff Essick was liable as an integral participant or for failing to intervene, because the allegations did not show that Essick planned, participated in, or had an opportunity to stop the specific conduct at the scene. The court nevertheless allowed McDonald’s supervisory-liability claim against Essick to proceed. McDonald alleged that Essick knew about ongoing misconduct and failed to reform policies, training, supervision, and practices. The court found that allegations about department policies, prior incidents, audits, studies, and reports plausibly showed deliberate indifference and acquiescence to constitutional violations.

The court similarly rejected McDonald’s integral-participant and failure-to-intervene theories against Administrative Sergeant Kidder. But it allowed a supervisory-liability claim against Kidder because McDonald alleged that Kidder supervised and trained Perkins and Clegg and approved the arrest charge without investigating the use of force or the circumstances of the arrest.

The court allowed the § 1983 claim against Clegg to proceed under the integral-participant theory. McDonald alleged that Clegg witnessed Perkins’s use of force, failed to intervene, and then helped search McDonald. The court found those allegations sufficient at the pleading stage.

Municipal-liability claim

The court denied the motion to dismiss McDonald’s claim against Sonoma County and Town of Windsor under the rule commonly called Monell liability. That rule can make a local government responsible when its policies, customs, or deliberately indifferent failure to train cause a constitutional violation. The court found that McDonald supported his allegations with audit reports, a human-rights report, and allegations concerning prior incidents and the governments’ alleged failure to address excessive force. These allegations plausibly suggested deliberate indifference to widespread constitutional violations.

State-law claims

The court denied the motion to dismiss McDonald’s negligent-hiring claim against Sheriff Essick. The court found that McDonald plausibly alleged Essick negligently retained and failed to supervise Perkins and Clegg, whom McDonald alleged had unlawfully searched and seized him.

The court denied the motion to dismiss McDonald’s intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim against Perkins. It found that the alleged unlawful arrest, search, and use of force—including knocking McDonald unconscious and breaking his teeth—could qualify as extreme and outrageous conduct and could support the required emotional-distress allegations.

The court also denied the motion to dismiss McDonald’s claim under California’s Bane Civil Rights Act. The court found that McDonald plausibly alleged the underlying constitutional violations and that an unlawful arrest combined with excessive force could constitute coercion beyond the coercion inherent in detention itself.

Disposition

The court expressly stated that it granted in part and denied in part the defendants’ motion to dismiss. It denied the motion as to Count I, the § 1983 claims against Perkins and Clegg; Count II, the Monell claim against Sonoma County and Town of Windsor; Count III, the § 1983 claim against Essick and Kidder; Count V, negligent hiring; Count VII, intentional infliction of emotional distress; Counts XI and XII, the Bane Act claims; and Count XV, the respondeat-superior claim against Sonoma County and Town of Windsor.

The court granted the motion without prejudice as to McDonald’s request for injunctive relief. It found that McDonald had not shown a sufficient likelihood that he would suffer similar future harm, and it gave him 30 days to amend the complaint with allegations supporting injunctive relief if a factual basis existed. The opinion’s conclusion lists these dispositions but does not state dispositions for every one of the fifteen counts described earlier.