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N.D. Cal.Substantive rulingFiled Jan. 13, 2021

Tammie C. v. Commisioner of Social Security Administration

Judge
Thomas Hixson
Docket
3:20-cv-01008
Court
U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
Pages
18
Social SecuritySummary Judgment
In one sentence

In Tammie C. v. Saul, Judge Hixson affirmed the denial of disability benefits, denying Tammie C.’s motion and granting Saul’s cross-motion.

Who this affects

Tammie C., whose claim for disability benefits remained denied, and Andrew Saul in his role as Commissioner of Social Security.

What happened

In Tammie C. v. Andrew Saul, Tammie C. asked the court to overturn the Social Security Administration’s decision denying her disability benefits. She argued that her medical conditions prevented her from working and that the administrative law judge wrongly evaluated her past work, other available jobs, and a psychologist’s opinion.

The court found that the administrative law judge did not adequately explain why Tammie C.’s cashier job counted as past relevant work because her earnings were below the agency’s threshold. But the court considered that error harmless because the judge had also found, based on vocational-expert testimony, that Tammie C. could perform other work, including router clerk jobs. The court also rejected her challenges to that finding and to the treatment of the psychologist’s opinion.

Judge Hixson denied Tammie C.’s motion for summary judgment and granted Andrew Saul’s cross-motion. The court therefore upheld the denial of disability benefits and ordered that the case be terminated after entry of a separate judgment.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
Tammie C. v. Commisioner of Social Security Administration · No. 3:20-cv-01008
Judge
Thomas Hixson
Date
Jan. 13, 2021

Background

Tammie C. sought judicial review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) of the Social Security Administration’s final decision denying her claim for Disability Insurance Benefits. She alleged disability beginning October 17, 2015. The agency denied her claim and her request for reconsideration. After a hearing at which she was represented by counsel, Administrative Law Judge Debra M. Underwood issued an unfavorable decision. The Appeals Council declined review, making the administrative law judge’s decision final.

The administrative law judge found that Tammie C. had several severe impairments, including plantar fasciitis, tendon conditions affecting her feet, rotator cuff tendinosis, obesity, depression, anxiety, and a possible learning disability. The judge determined that she could perform a limited range of light work, including sitting without limits, standing or walking for six hours in an eight-hour day, lifting or carrying specified weights, occasionally performing certain postural activities, occasionally reaching above shoulder level with her right arm, and performing simple, routine, repetitive tasks. The judge found that she could perform past work as a fast-food cashier and, alternatively, could perform work as a router clerk, furniture rental clerk, or storage rental clerk.

Issues and Analysis

Tammie C. raised three arguments: the administrative law judge wrongly found that she could perform her past work as a fast-food cashier; the alternative finding about other jobs was unsupported; and the judge misinterpreted psychologist Jenny Forman’s opinion.

Past relevant work. Past relevant work must have been performed within the relevant 15-year period, at the level of substantial gainful activity, and long enough for the claimant to learn it. Tammie C.’s wage records showed that she earned $679.16 from Nation’s Foodservice in all of 2004, although she worked there through October of that year. The court found that these earnings were below the agency’s substantial-gainful-activity level and created a presumption that the cashier work was not substantial gainful activity.

The court held that the administrative law judge failed to rebut that presumption. The judge did not address the regulatory factors relevant to whether low-earning work was nevertheless substantial gainful activity and merely repeated the regulatory language. The Commissioner’s arguments attempting to supply additional reasons were impermissible after-the-fact explanations because the court reviews the reasons the administrative law judge actually gave. The court therefore found that the step-four finding concerning past relevant work was legally inadequate.

The court nevertheless held that the error was harmless because the administrative law judge made an alternative step-five finding. At step five, the agency must show that the claimant can perform a significant number of jobs in the national economy. The vocational expert testified about router clerk, furniture rental clerk, and storage rental clerk jobs. The court found that the administrative law judge properly relied on the testimony identifying those jobs. Even if the furniture rental clerk and storage rental clerk positions conflicted with Tammie C.’s limitation to simple, routine, repetitive tasks, the vocational expert identified approximately 53,000 router clerk jobs nationally. The court held that this was enough to support the alternative finding.

Psychologist’s opinion. Dr. Forman stated that Tammie C. had mild impairment in tolerating the stress of an eight-hour workday but also stated that she could work four to eight hours per day performing simple tasks. Tammie C. argued that this meant she could work a full day on some days but only four hours on others, which would prevent her from working regularly and continuously.

The court rejected that argument. It explained that the administrative law judge, rather than a medical source, determines a claimant’s residual functional capacity—the most work the claimant can perform despite her impairments. The judge was not required to adopt every part of Dr. Forman’s opinion. The court found that the judge considered Dr. Forman’s findings, other medical opinions, largely normal mental-status findings, and Tammie C.’s reported symptoms, and that substantial evidence supported the resulting residual functional capacity.

Disposition

The court affirmed the administrative decision because the step-five finding was supported by substantial evidence despite the step-four error. It DENIED Tammie C.’s motion for summary judgment and GRANTED the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment. The court stated that it would enter a separate judgment and that the Clerk would then terminate the case.

The authoritative version

Read the full 18-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

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