Winston v. Saul

Background

Carolynne A. Winston appealed the Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of her disability-benefits claim. After Winston filed a motion for summary judgment, the parties stipulated to a remand for further proceedings, and the court entered judgment based on that stipulation. The court later awarded Winston $6,321.70 in attorney’s fees and expenses under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA).

After the remand proceedings, Winston received approximately $95,000 in past-due benefits, along with other benefits. Her lawyer, Katherine Siegfried, represented her in the federal-court case and in the administrative proceedings after remand. Siegfried petitioned for $24,083.90 in attorney’s fees under Section 406(b) of the Social Security Act and the parties’ contingent-fee agreement. The agreement allowed a fee of up to 25% of past-due benefits if the case was successful. The Social Security Administration withheld $24,083.90, which represented 25% of Winston’s past-due benefits.

The government took no position on the fee petition. Siegfried submitted records showing 30.6 hours of work connected with the district-court proceedings and stated that she spent an additional 13.6 hours on the administrative proceedings. She also stated that, if the court awarded Section 406(b) fees, she would reimburse Winston for the EAJA award.

Legal standard and analysis

Section 406(b) permits a court to award a reasonable fee for an attorney’s representation in a Social Security case, up to 25% of the claimant’s past-due benefits. The fee is paid from the claimant’s past-due benefits rather than by the government. A court may award the fee even when the past-due benefits result from administrative proceedings after a court-ordered remand.

The court found the requested $24,083.90 reasonable. Nothing in the record indicated that Siegfried’s performance was inadequate or that she delayed the proceedings to increase her fee. The court noted that, after Siegfried filed the summary-judgment motion, she obtained the Commissioner’s agreement to remand, and Winston then received past-due and ongoing benefits. The award for 44.2 hours of work produced an effective hourly rate of approximately $545, which the court found reasonable in light of comparable Section 406(b) awards.

Order

The court granted counsel’s motion for attorney’s fees in the amount of $24,083.90. It also ordered counsel to refund Winston $6,231.70 previously awarded as EAJA fees. The conclusion refers to the motion as arising under 42 U.S.C. § 405(b), although the petition and the court’s analysis identify Section 406(b) as the governing provision.