Bell v. Williams

Background

Defendants moved to dismiss the third and sixth causes of action in Vincent Keith Bell’s fifth amended complaint. The third cause of action alleged municipal liability, commonly called a Monell claim, based on the City and County of San Francisco’s alleged safety-cell and SORT practices. The sixth cause of action alleged that defendants violated Bell’s First Amendment rights by retaliating against him for complaining verbally and in writing about Leung’s alleged sexual harassment.

The court had previously dismissed both causes of action and allowed Bell to amend. Defendants argued that the fifth amended complaint still did not cure the deficiencies identified in the earlier order.

Third Cause of Action: Municipal Liability

The court held that Bell alleged enough facts to proceed, although it described the issue as a close call. Bell alleged a pattern and practice of misusing or authorizing the misuse of safety cells for disciplinary and retaliatory reasons rather than their intended purpose. He also alleged that deputies were not trained on the use of SORT and the safety cell, that a SORT team extracted him from his cell, and that he had been improperly placed in a safety cell at least six times. He further alleged that he had observed other pretrial detainees being wrongly placed in safety cells and that a San Francisco Chronicle article reported investigations, lawsuits, and reports concerning improper safety-cell use.

The court found these allegations sufficient to plead both a pattern and practice of safety-cell misuse and a failure to train deputies properly. Bell also alleged that Michele Fisher had final policymaking authority for SORT and safety-cell policies, was required to approve safety-cell placements as Facility Commander, and approved Sergeant Williams’s order for the cell extraction and Bell’s placement in the safety cell. The court concluded that defendants’ arguments about whether Fisher had final policymaking authority raised factual issues beyond the pleadings.

Sixth Cause of Action: First Amendment Retaliation

Bell alleged that defendants Michele Fisher, Williams, and Leung retaliated against him after he verbally complained and submitted a written grievance about Leung’s alleged sexual harassment. He alleged that Leung singled him out for punishment, while Williams and Fisher participated by carrying out or approving disciplinary action despite knowing about his complaint and by failing to meaningfully investigate his grievance.

The court found that the amended allegations clarified the protected conduct, the timeline, the number of defendants, and each defendant’s alleged actions. It held that the allegations were sufficient at the pleading stage to allege the elements of First Amendment retaliation, including adverse action because of protected conduct, chilling of First Amendment activity, and action that did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal. The court stated that defendants’ arguments about causation were better suited to review on summary judgment, after development of the factual record.

Disposition

The court denied defendants’ motion to dismiss the third and sixth causes of action. The order did not decide the ultimate merits of either claim; it determined only that Bell had pleaded enough facts for both claims to proceed. Judge Susan Illston signed the order on February 10, 2021.

Classification Basis

This is a procedural order because it resolved a motion under the pleading rules rather than deciding the ultimate merits of Bell’s claims.