Melton v. Regional Center of the East Bay, Inc.

Background

Selena Melton, proceeding through her guardian ad litem, Beverly Cannon Mosier, sued the California Department of Developmental Services (the Department), Regional Center of the East Bay, Inc. (RCEB), and Arleen’s Residential Care #3, which stated that it had been incorrectly sued under that name. The complaint alleged that Melton is deaf-blind, communicates using Tactile American Sign Language, and had lived for decades in a group home where staff could not communicate in American Sign Language or provide services tailored to a deaf-blind consumer.

The complaint asserted two theories: that defendants made a specific housing decision and failed to provide specific communication aids, and that the Department and RCEB had systemic policies or practices that failed to ensure effective communication for deaf and deaf-blind consumers. Melton sought injunctive relief and damages under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, Title III of that Act, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, the Fair Housing Act, several California statutes, and negligence law.

Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

The defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), which concerns subject-matter jurisdiction, and Rule 12(b)(6), which concerns failure to state a legally sufficient claim. The court held that Melton had not used the Lanterman Act’s administrative fair-hearing process for any of her claims.

The court ruled that claims based on her particular placement at Arleen’s and the failure to provide specific communication services had to be presented first through that fair-hearing process. It therefore dismissed all housing-specific claims, regardless of which defendant was sued. The court dismissed all causes of action against RCEB and Arleen’s on that ground, as well as the claims against the Department based on the individualized housing decision and specific communication services.

The court declined at that stage to analyze a separate Lanterman Act complaint process because the parties had not adequately briefed the distinction between that process and the fair-hearing process. The court also granted leave to plead a theory under which the housing-specific claims might not be subject to the hearing requirement, consistent with the rules governing filings.

Standing and Timeliness

The Department argued that Melton lacked standing because her injuries were not traceable to the Department and could not be remedied by an order against it. The court found that challenge moot as to the housing-specific claims because those claims were dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

The court, however, held that Melton had standing to challenge an alleged systemic failure by the Department to ensure compliance with disability-discrimination laws. The court reasoned that the Department could require regional centers to comply with those laws and could take steps to address noncompliance. It also concluded that the requested systemic injunctive relief could redress the alleged injury.

The court rejected the Department’s timeliness challenge to the systemic claims at the pleading stage. Melton alleged that the Department’s discriminatory conduct was ongoing, so the court held that those claims were not barred by the statute of limitations under the continuing-violations theory.

Sufficiency of the Systemic Claims

The remaining claims were Melton’s Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 claims against the Department based on the alleged systemic failure to provide meaningful communication access. The court held that Melton adequately alleged that she was denied equal benefits of the Department’s services because of her disability.

But the court held that the complaint did not adequately plead intentional discrimination for purposes of compensatory damages. Under the Ninth Circuit’s deliberate-indifference standard, a plaintiff must allege that the public entity knew harm to a federally protected right was substantially likely and failed to act in a deliberate way. Melton alleged, on information and belief, that the Department had received notice of a statewide problem involving the failure to provide auxiliary aids and services. The court found that allegation, without additional facts showing the Department’s awareness and failure to correct the problem, was insufficient.

Disposition

The court granted all three motions to dismiss without prejudice. It dismissed the complaint in its entirety with leave to amend, including the claims against RCEB and Arleen’s and the systemic claims against the Department. Melton was given twenty-one days to file an amended complaint, and the defendants were given twenty-one days to respond after it was filed.