Melton v. Regional Center of the East Bay, Inc.

Background

Selena Melton, through her guardian ad litem Beverly Cannon Mosier, sued the California Department of Developmental Services (DDS), the Regional Center of the East Bay, Inc. (RCEB), and Arleen’s Residential Care, Inc. She alleged violations of federal and California laws prohibiting disability discrimination. Melton was born deaf, later became blind, and used Tactile American Sign Language to communicate.

Melton had received services under California’s Lanterman Act and had lived since 1994 in a state-licensed group home owned and operated by Arleen’s. She alleged that RCEB and Arleen’s failed to provide staff who could communicate with her in Tactile ASL, even after her individual program plan (IPP) was updated to reflect an agreement that she needed such communication support. She also alleged that DDS and RCEB failed to adopt policies ensuring effective communication and equal access for deaf and deaf-blind consumers generally.

The amended complaint asserted nine causes of action: Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) against DDS; Title III of the ADA against RCEB and Arleen’s; Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act against DDS and RCEB; the Fair Housing Act against Arleen’s; California Government Code section 11135 against RCEB; the Unruh Civil Rights Act against RCEB and Arleen’s; the California Disabled Persons Act against RCEB and Arleen’s; the Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act against Arleen’s; and negligence against RCEB and Arleen’s. The defendants moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, failure to state a claim, and untimeliness. RCEB separately moved for sanctions against Melton’s counsel based on arguments about administrative exhaustion.

Administrative exhaustion

The defendants argued that Melton had to use the Lanterman Act’s fair-hearing procedure before filing suit. The court agreed in part. It held that claims based on the failure to provide services included in, or requested under, Melton’s IPP concerned her individual entitlement to services and were subject to the mandatory fair-hearing process. Because Melton had not exhausted that process, the court lacked jurisdiction over those IPP-based claims.

The court reached a different conclusion for the claims alleging systemic failures to adopt antidiscrimination policies. Those allegations concerned equal access for consumers generally, not only a specific decision about Melton’s services. The court held that these claims were subject to the Lanterman Act’s complaint process rather than its fair-hearing process.

The court found that Melton substantially complied with the complaint process. Disability Rights California, then representing Melton and other consumers, had sent letters to DDS and RCEB describing systemic communication barriers and Melton’s circumstances. Representatives also met with officials from both entities. Although Melton did not obtain a written proposed resolution from RCEB or a written administrative decision from DDS, the court held that the communications gave the defendants notice and an opportunity to address the alleged violations. The court therefore found that the complaint process had been exhausted for the systemic claims.

Timeliness

DDS and RCEB argued that the claims were untimely because they were based on incidents occurring six to twenty-six years before the lawsuit. The court applied the continuing-violations doctrine, which can allow a claim involving an ongoing discriminatory policy or practice to proceed when the discriminatory conditions continue into the limitations period. Because the amended complaint alleged that accessibility barriers were ongoing, the court denied the motion to dismiss based on untimeliness.

Sufficiency of the claims

The court denied DDS’s motion to dismiss the Title II ADA claim. It held that the amended complaint adequately alleged that Melton was denied meaningful access to DDS services because of her disability and adequately alleged deliberate indifference for purposes of seeking monetary relief. Deliberate indifference requires allegations showing notice of the need for an accommodation and a failure to act.

The court also denied RCEB’s motion to dismiss the Title III ADA claim. It held that the amended complaint adequately alleged that Melton was denied meaningful access to services because of her disability. The court rejected RCEB’s argument that it could avoid Title III obligations because it was not itself a place of public accommodation. Based on the alleged contractual relationship between RCEB and group-home vendors, the court held that RCEB had to ensure compliance with Title III for services it helped provide.

The court denied the motions to dismiss the Section 504 Rehabilitation Act claim against both DDS and RCEB. It found the allegations sufficient concerning disability discrimination, DDS’s notice and failure to act, and RCEB’s alleged receipt of federal financial assistance. The court also denied RCEB’s motion to dismiss the claim under California Government Code section 11135, finding that the amended complaint sufficiently alleged disability-based exclusion from services coordinated by RCEB.

The court denied RCEB’s motion to dismiss the Unruh Civil Rights Act claim. Although RCEB argued that it was not a covered “business establishment,” the court found the allegations about RCEB’s nonprofit structure, businesslike purposes, employees, services, fees, offices, and activities sufficient to allow the claim to proceed at the motion-to-dismiss stage.

The court denied RCEB’s motion to dismiss the California Disabled Persons Act claim. It held that the Act covers equal access to services, not only physical access to spaces, and that an ADA violation also constitutes a violation of the Act. Because the ADA claims remained viable, the court allowed the California Disabled Persons Act claim to continue.

Disposition

The court granted in part and denied in part the motions to dismiss. The first, second, third, fifth, sixth, and seventh causes of action survived the jurisdictional and pleading challenges. Those claims were the Title II ADA claim, Title III ADA claim, Section 504 claim, section 11135 claim, Unruh Act claim, and California Disabled Persons Act claim.

The court dismissed with prejudice the fourth cause of action under the Fair Housing Act, the eighth cause of action under the Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act, and the ninth cause of action for negligence. It also denied RCEB’s motion for sanctions, finding that Melton’s arguments about the complaint process were not frivolous. Defendants were ordered to respond to the remaining claims within twenty days, and the court set an initial case-management conference for December 13, 2021.