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N.D. Cal.Substantive rulingFiled Feb. 25, 2021

Cobarrubia v. Edwards

Judge
Kandis Westmore
Docket
4:19-cv-07899
Court
U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
Pages
17
Civil RightsSection 1983Summary JudgmentQualified Immunity
In one sentence

In Cobarrubia v. Edwards, Judge Westmore partly granted and partly denied summary judgment, leaving a jury to decide whether a police dog bit Cobarrubia too long.

Who this affects

Nicole Cobarrubia’s excessive-force claim against Deputy Jeffrey Edwards; the ruling also addressed arguments made by Alameda County and Edwards, but the court stated that only the claim against Edwards remained.

What happened

Cobarrubia v. Edwards concerns Nicole Cobarrubia’s claim that Deputy Jeffrey Edwards used excessive force during her 2017 arrest by using a police dog, punching her, and allowing the dog to keep biting her. Defendants argued that her probation revocation barred the claim and that the force was reasonable.

The court ruled that the probation revocation barred claims challenging the dog’s initial deployment and some force used to subdue Cobarrubia. It also granted summary judgment on the claim that Edwards’s punches were excessive. But the court held that the claim about the length of the dog’s bite could proceed because a jury could find that the bite lasted longer than necessary.

Judge Westmore denied qualified immunity to Edwards because a factual dispute remained about whether the continued bite was excessive and whether it was needed to handcuff Cobarrubia. The motion for summary judgment was granted in part and denied in part, leaving only the duration of the dog’s bite-hold for the jury.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
Cobarrubia v. Edwards · No. 4:19-cv-07899
Judge
Kandis Westmore
Date
Feb. 25, 2021

Background

Nicole Cobarrubia was arrested at her trailer on December 4, 2017, after deputies confirmed that an active felony arrest warrant had been issued. The deputies knew about her prior convictions, her searchable probation, prior resistance to arrest, and prior possession of firearms, knives, ammunition, and stun guns. After repeated announcements, deputies pried open the trailer door. Deputy Jeffrey Edwards entered with his police dog, Grizzly, and directed the dog to search for Cobarrubia.

Grizzly found Cobarrubia on a bed with her hands concealed under her body. Edwards commanded the dog to bite her left arm. Cobarrubia testified that she woke only when the dog bit her. She did not comply with commands to show her hands or bring the dog to Edwards and kicked and hit the dog. Edwards tried to secure her right hand, delivered two elbow blows to her face, and eventually helped restrain her. The dog released its bite after Edwards gained control of Cobarrubia’s arms, and deputies then handcuffed her. Cobarrubia was treated for lacerations to her eye, face, and left arm.

Cobarrubia originally asserted four causes of action against Alameda County and Edwards. The parties stipulated to dismissal of the first, third, and fourth causes of action, leaving the second cause of action against Edwards for excessive force under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

The parties’ arguments

Defendants sought summary judgment on three grounds: that the excessive-force claim was barred by the rule from Heck v. Humphrey; that the force was reasonable; and that Edwards was protected by qualified immunity. Cobarrubia argued, among other things, that the length of the dog’s bite was excessive even if the initial use of the dog was not subject to challenge.

Heck ruling

The court explained that the Heck rule generally prevents a person from pursuing a civil-rights claim when winning that claim would necessarily undermine an existing criminal conviction or sentence. Cobarrubia had admitted probation violations involving resisting a peace officer and battering a police canine and had received a 270-day county-jail sentence.

The court held that at least part of the excessive-force claim was barred. Because the conviction for battering the police dog required that the dog have been acting lawfully, Cobarrubia could not use this lawsuit to challenge the dog’s initial deployment. Her conviction for resisting a peace officer also precluded claims concerning some force used to subdue her, including entering the trailer and deploying the dog.

The court distinguished the initial bite from the length of the bite-hold. It held that the initial bite was barred by the Heck rule, but the claim that the dog continued biting for more than three minutes was not necessarily barred because that conduct was temporally distinct. The court noted that Cobarrubia was not handcuffed until after the dog released its bite, allowing a possible inference that the bite lasted longer than necessary.

Excessive-force analysis

The court granted summary judgment on Cobarrubia’s allegation that Edwards’s two “distraction blows” were excessive. Cobarrubia did not address that issue in her opposition, so the court treated the argument as waived.

As to the dog bite, the court concluded that the only remaining issue was its duration, because the Heck rule barred a challenge to the dog’s deployment. The court could not determine from the evidence, including body-camera footage, whether keeping the dog’s bite for approximately three minutes was excessive. Viewing disputed facts in Cobarrubia’s favor, a rational jury would not be required to find that the continued bite was reasonable, particularly because the dog released its bite before Cobarrubia was successfully handcuffed. Summary judgment was therefore denied in part as to that issue.

Qualified immunity

Qualified immunity is a defense that can protect a government official from civil damages unless the official violated a constitutional right that was clearly established at the time. The court denied qualified immunity to Edwards. It found a genuine dispute of material fact about whether the bite lasted too long and whether the continued bite was necessary to complete the handcuffing. The court also stated that it had been clearly established for more than twenty years that an excessively long canine bite or improper continuation of a canine attack could constitute excessive force.

Other rulings

The court granted Defendants’ request for judicial notice as to the identified court documents, but denied the request to treat certain facts in those documents as true through judicial notice. The court sustained Defendants’ hearsay objection to Cobarrubia’s testimony about a neighbor’s statements. It sustained in part and overruled in part Defendants’ objection to the report of Ernest Burwell, allowing the portion addressing whether the bite lasted longer than necessary to take Cobarrubia into custody.

Disposition

The court granted in part and denied in part Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The only remaining question for the jury was whether the duration of Grizzly’s bite-hold constituted excessive force.

The authoritative version

Read the full 17-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

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