Jones v. Pfeiffer

Background

Dyrell W. Jones filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, the federal law allowing a state prisoner to seek relief when custody allegedly violates the Constitution or federal law. Jones represented himself. A Contra Costa County jury convicted him in 2014 of attempted murder of a peace officer and being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition, with an enhancement for personally discharging a firearm. The state trial court sentenced him to 39 years to life in prison. The California Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment and remanded only to determine whether Jones was entitled to conduct credits; the California Supreme Court later denied review.

The federal case was initially stayed so Jones could exhaust his claims in state court. His amended federal petition asserted five claims: destruction of material exculpatory evidence, ineffective assistance of trial counsel, insufficient evidence to support the grand-jury indictment, cumulative trial errors, and ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Before the final merits decision, the court denied without prejudice the motion to dismiss the evidence-destruction claim and granted the motion to dismiss the grand-jury claim because it was not cognizable—meaning it was not a claim that federal habeas law permits the court to review.

Court’s analysis

Destruction of the windshield. Jones argued that the prosecution violated due process by failing to preserve the windshield of Officer Richard Hosier’s patrol car. The court concluded that the state courts had rejected this claim under an independent and adequate state procedural rule because Jones had not raised it on appeal. That procedural default generally barred federal review unless Jones showed cause and prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice.

Jones argued that ineffective assistance by his appellate lawyer supplied cause for the default. The court rejected that argument. It held that appellate counsel was not deficient because the claim would have been procedurally forfeited on appeal, and because the claim would have failed on the merits. The trial record included testimony from prosecution and defense experts about the bullet holes in the windshield. Both experts agreed that one hole came from outside the patrol car, while they differed about how many of the clustered holes came from inside. Jones’s own expert testified that the laminated windshield could not reliably show the order in which the bullets struck it. The court therefore found no reasonable probability that raising the claim would have changed the appeal’s outcome.

The court stated that the windshield claim was denied because it was procedurally defaulted and, alternatively, because it failed on the merits.

Destruction of the parole-revocation hearing recording. Jones also argued that the prosecution intentionally destroyed a recording of his parole-revocation hearing. The court treated the recording as only potentially exculpatory evidence. Under the governing rule, a due-process violation required proof that the police acted in bad faith. The court found that the recording had been destroyed by the California Board of Prison Terms under a routine one-year administrative retention policy, not by the police. Jones did not identify authority allowing the Board’s conduct to be attributed to the Pittsburgh Police Department or the Contra Costa County prosecutor’s office. The court held that the state-court decision rejecting this claim was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court law.

Ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Jones argued that his trial lawyer failed to impeach Officer Hosier and eyewitness Samuel Isaac and failed to seek Hosier’s personnel file through a state-law procedure known as a Pitchess motion. The state court had found these claims procedurally barred because they could have been raised on direct appeal, and the federal court held that Jones had not shown cause and prejudice to overcome that bar.

The court also rejected the claims on the merits. Under the constitutional standard for ineffective assistance, Jones had to show both that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that the alleged error probably affected the result.

As to Hosier, the court found that defense counsel had in fact questioned him about inconsistent accounts of how many shots he fired from inside the patrol car. Counsel also used a photograph showing multiple bullet holes and emphasized the inconsistencies during closing argument. Although the prosecution’s firearms expert testified that Hosier’s gun was functioning properly, the court found that this evidence itself placed Hosier’s account about the gun jamming in question.

As to Isaac, the court found that defense counsel elicited helpful testimony from Isaac and obtained the additional statements Jones identified while questioning Detective McSorley. Because counsel presented the information Jones said should have been presented, the ineffective-assistance claim failed.

As to the Pitchess motion, Jones speculated that Hosier’s personnel file might contain information useful for impeachment, including use-of-force incidents or complaints. The court held that this speculation did not show either deficient performance or prejudice. Jones had not shown what the file contained or that it would have changed the verdict.

Cumulative error and appellate counsel. The court rejected Jones’s argument that the combined effect of the alleged errors denied him a fair trial because he had not shown that the alleged errors, even considered together, created meaningful doubt about the verdict. The court also rejected his claim that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the evidence-destruction, trial-counsel, and cumulative-error claims, relying on its conclusions that those underlying claims failed.

Disposition

Judge Vince Chhabria denied the petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The court denied a certificate of appealability because reasonable jurists would not find its assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong. It directed the clerk to enter judgment for the respondent, Christian Pfeiffer, and close the file.