Stevenson v. Madden

Background

Paul Stevenson, a state inmate, filed a federal petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his criminal convictions. The charges arose from a shooting after a party in San Leandro on October 1, 2011. A Ford Explorer carrying seven people was blocked by a white sedan, and multiple shots were fired into the vehicle. Three passengers died and three were wounded. Two witnesses identified Stevenson as one of the shooters, and evidence also showed that Stevenson made statements after the shooting acknowledging that he had fired his gun.

A jury found Stevenson guilty of three murders and four attempted murders. The trial court imposed three terms of life without the possibility of parole, along with a consecutive 75-years-to-life firearm-enhancement term for the three murder counts. The attempted-murder sentences were to run concurrently with the murder sentences. The California Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. Stevenson later raised an ineffective-assistance claim concerning his appellate counsel, but the state courts denied his requests for relief.

Claims and Legal Standards

Stevenson raised four jury-instruction claims and one claim that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that the evidence was insufficient. Under the federal law governing review of state convictions, the court could grant relief only if the state court’s decision conflicted with clearly established United States Supreme Court law, unreasonably applied that law, or rested on an unreasonable factual determination. For the ineffective-assistance claim, which the state courts had not decided on the merits, the court reviewed the record independently.

Jury-Instruction Claims

Natural-and-probable-consequences instruction. Stevenson argued that the instructions allowed the jury to convict him of first-degree murder without finding that he personally acted willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation. The court explained that the California Court of Appeal had distinguished the instructions in Stevenson’s case from instructions previously held improper under California law. The instruction used at Stevenson’s trial stated that a defendant was guilty of first-degree murder only if the prosecution proved that “he acted willfully, deliberately and with premeditation.” The federal court deferred to the state court’s interpretation of state law and concluded that the jury instructions did not violate federal law. The court also rejected Stevenson’s argument that the jury could not properly apply the instructions without cross-referencing them, because juries are presumed to follow their instructions.

The court acknowledged that California law later changed to eliminate murder liability under the natural-and-probable-consequences theory. But that change took effect after Stevenson’s 2014 trial and after the California Court of Appeal’s 2018 decision. The change therefore did not make the state court’s earlier decision objectively unreasonable under the federal habeas standard. The court denied this claim.

Lesser-offense instructions. Stevenson argued that the trial court should have instructed the jury on assault with a firearm and conspiracy to commit assault with a firearm as lesser included offenses. The court held that the California Court of Appeal’s determination that these offenses were not lesser included offenses was binding. It also stated that no United States Supreme Court authority established a constitutional right to these instructions in a non-capital case. In addition, the court concluded that the evidence did not support the proposed instructions because the evidence showed that the shooters ambushed the vehicle and intentionally fired guns into it. The court denied this claim.

“Kill zone” instruction. Stevenson argued that the instruction used for the attempted-murder counts was unclear and allowed the jury to convict without finding that he intended to kill the other passengers. The court stated that, even if the claim had not been forfeited in state court, it failed on the merits. The instruction required the jury to find that Stevenson intended to kill the target passenger and either intended to kill another named passenger or intended to kill everyone within the area of danger. The court found the instruction unambiguous and concluded that the evidence—multiple shots fired from different directions into a vehicle containing several people—supported giving the instruction. The court denied this claim.

Motive instruction. Stevenson argued that the jury should have been told that the prosecution had to prove his motive beyond a reasonable doubt. The court rejected the argument because motive was not an element of the charged crimes. The jury was instructed that the prosecution did not have to prove motive and that the prosecution still had to prove every required element beyond a reasonable doubt. The court found no reasonable likelihood that the motive instruction reduced the prosecution’s burden of proof and denied the claim.

Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel

Stevenson argued that his appellate lawyer was ineffective for failing to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence. To prevail, Stevenson had to show both that counsel acted unreasonably and that there was a reasonable probability he would have won his appeal if counsel had raised the issue.

The court concluded that the evidence was sufficient under the constitutional standard, which asks whether any rational juror viewing the evidence favorably to the prosecution could have found the essential elements proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The court relied on testimony from Matthew Hudson and Erica Brown identifying Stevenson, evidence of continuing hostility between Stevenson’s group and the victims’ group, and testimony that Stevenson said after the shooting that he had emptied his gun’s magazine. The court also considered evidence favorable to Stevenson, including the absence of forensic evidence tying him to the shooting and testimony that other men were shooters, but concluded that a reasonable jury could resolve those issues against him.

Because the sufficiency-of-the-evidence argument was unlikely to succeed under the demanding appellate standard, the court held that appellate counsel was not unreasonable for omitting it. For the same reason, Stevenson had not shown that he was prejudiced by counsel’s omission. The court denied this claim after independently reviewing the record.

Disposition

The court denied Stevenson’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. It also denied a certificate of appealability, entered judgment in favor of the respondent, and ordered the file closed.