Giles v. Davis

Background

Ossie Giles, a state prisoner incarcerated at San Quentin State Prison, filed a pro se action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking money damages. The court’s earlier screening order found potentially valid First and Eighth Amendment claims against several prison officials. The claims arose from a November 8, 2017 confrontation, disciplinary reports, Giles’s placement in administrative segregation, and his allegation that officials retaliated against him for filing a grievance against Correctional Officer J. Cartwright.

Giles alleged that Cartwright called him a pedophile during the confrontation and later wrote a false rules-violation report. He alleged that J. Jaugan wrote a false supplemental report. Giles further alleged that other officials approved, relied on, or failed to correct those reports, causing him to be placed in administrative segregation from November 15 through December 28, 2017. At a disciplinary hearing, Lieutenant R. Shelton found Giles guilty based on a preponderance of the evidence, and Chief Disciplinary Officer Y. Samara affirmed the result.

Exhaustion ruling

The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires prisoners to properly complete available prison grievance procedures before filing a federal action about prison conditions. During his deposition, Giles testified that he had never filed an administrative grievance concerning his claim that Broomfield and M. Voong denied him access to established grievance procedures.

The court held that Giles conceded he had not exhausted that claim before filing suit. It therefore granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to the First Amendment claim against Broomfield and Voong, and dismissed that claim without prejudice to refiling after exhaustion of California’s prison administrative process.

First Amendment retaliation claims

To establish retaliation for protected conduct, a prisoner must show, among other things, that the defendant took adverse action because of the prisoner’s protected activity. The court found no evidence that VanMastrigt, G. Forncrook, A. Maxfield, R. Pearl, Y. Sangmaster, J. Arnold, Shelton, or Samara knew about Giles’s November 13, 2017 grievance against Cartwright or acted because of it. Giles’s assertion that these officials could have released him from administrative segregation was not enough to show retaliatory motive. The court granted summary judgment on this retaliation claim.

The court also granted summary judgment on Giles’s retaliation claim against Cartwright and Jaugan. It found no evidence that Jaugan knew about the grievance. As to Cartwright, the evidence included his declaration that he did not know about the grievance when he prepared the report and that he prepared it after returning from sick leave and other time off. The court concluded that timing alone did not establish a connection between the grievance and the disciplinary report.

Eighth Amendment claim concerning mental-health needs

Giles alleged that Cartwright and Jaugan were deliberately indifferent to his mental-health needs because their allegedly false reports led to administrative segregation, which allegedly caused anxiety and sleep deprivation. The court held that the record did not show that either official knew about Giles’s mental-health concerns when the reports were prepared. Giles testified that he did not tell psychologist R. Pearl about anxiety, sleep deprivation, or another mental-health issue, and he reported to another psychologist that he had adapted somewhat to administrative segregation and denied changes in appetite or sleep.

The court also explained that false disciplinary charges alone do not violate a constitutional right. Because Giles offered only conclusory allegations connecting the reports to deliberate indifference, the court granted summary judgment on this Eighth Amendment claim.

Eighth Amendment claim concerning administrative segregation

The court held that Giles had not presented evidence creating a triable issue—that is, an issue for a jury—on whether his 44-day placement in administrative segregation amounted to cruel and unusual punishment. It therefore granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment on this Eighth Amendment claim.

Due process claims

Giles alleged that officials violated due process by failing to correct false reports and by placing him in administrative segregation without adequate procedures or evidentiary support. The court held that he had not shown that the officials knew the reports were fabricated or identified a protected liberty interest arising from their alleged failure to correct them.

The court also concluded that Giles received the procedural protections required for the disciplinary hearing, including advance written notice, at least 24 hours to prepare, a written explanation of the decision, and an opportunity to present evidence and call witnesses. Under the applicable standard, the record needed only some evidence supporting the disciplinary decision; the court found that Cartwright’s report and other materials met that standard. The court likewise found some evidence supporting Giles’s initial placement in administrative segregation while the investigation was pending. It granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the due process claim.

Disposition

The court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to all claims. It dismissed Giles’s unexhausted First Amendment claim against Broomfield and Voong without prejudice to refiling after exhaustion. The court closed the file and did not address defendants’ alternative qualified-immunity argument.