Martinez v. Redwood City School District

Background

Mary Martinez worked as the Community School Coordinator at Fair Oaks Community School, which the Redwood City School District’s Board of Trustees decided to close following declining enrollment. On March 27, 2018, during work hours, Martinez attended a San Mateo County Board of Supervisors meeting about the closure. She identified herself as the Community School Coordinator, spoke on behalf of Fair Oaks families and students, and criticized the District’s position on the closure.

Two days later, the District issued Martinez a warning letter criticizing, among other things, her attendance at the meeting during work hours, her identification as a District employee, and her denunciation of the District’s position. Martinez later received five additional warning letters concerning other workplace matters. The District issued a notice of intent to dismiss, which also listed her attendance at the school-closure meeting as one ground. The District terminated her employment on December 7, 2018, citing insubordination, absence without leave, misuse of District property, and violations of District rules or policies. Martinez then filed this lawsuit.

Claims and summary-judgment standard

Martinez initially brought employment-discrimination claims under California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act, a First Amendment retaliation claim, and a wrongful-discharge claim based on public policy. In opposing summary judgment, she conceded that she could not raise a triable issue of fact on the FEHA claims. The court therefore considered the First Amendment retaliation claim and the wrongful-discharge claim.

Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence shows that no reasonable factfinder could rule for the opposing party on a material issue. For a public employee’s First Amendment retaliation claim, the employee generally must show that she spoke about a matter of public concern, spoke as a private citizen rather than as part of her job, and that the speech substantially motivated the adverse employment action. The employer may then attempt to show that it would have taken the same action without the protected speech.

First Amendment retaliation

The District did not dispute that Martinez’s statements concerned a matter of public concern. It argued that she spoke as a public employee because she attended during work hours, identified herself by her District position, and testified that advocating for families was part of her job. The court concluded, however, that the evidence also supported finding that she spoke as a private citizen. The warning letter said she had not received permission to attend and should have taken time off, which could support an inference that attending the meeting was not part of her official duties. The meeting was open to the public and was not shown to be within Martinez’s chain of command. The court therefore found a genuine factual dispute on whether she spoke as a private citizen.

The court also found that a reasonable factfinder could view both the warning letter and the notice of intent to dismiss as adverse employment actions—actions reasonably likely to deter protected speech. The warning letter was issued two days after the meeting and expressly criticized the content of Martinez’s speech. Although the notice of intent to dismiss came about eight months after the meeting, it also identified her denunciation of the District’s closure position as a reason for dismissal. Those facts could support a finding that her speech was a substantial or motivating factor.

The District argued that it would have issued the warning and the dismissal notice for other reasons, including attending during work hours without permission, speaking for the District without authorization, and other workplace conduct. The court held that a reasonable factfinder could accept that explanation, but the evidence did not require that conclusion as a matter of law. The documents’ references to Martinez’s speech created genuine disputes of material fact, so the court denied summary judgment on the First Amendment retaliation claim.

Wrongful discharge

Under California law, wrongful discharge in violation of public policy is an exception to at-will employment when termination violates a fundamental public policy. Martinez based this claim partly on her First Amendment rights and partly on a public policy favoring the health and safety of students.

Because the court denied summary judgment on the First Amendment retaliation claim, it also denied summary judgment on the wrongful-discharge claim to the extent that claim was based on the alleged First Amendment violation. The court granted summary judgment on the portion based on the FEHA claims because Martinez had conceded those claims.

The court also granted summary judgment on the theory that Martinez was terminated for advocating postponement of the Thanksgiving Potluck to protect student health and safety. The court assumed, without deciding, that the cited California constitutional provision could establish a qualifying public policy. It found that Martinez had not presented evidence supporting an inference that the District disciplined her because it opposed protecting students’ health and safety. Instead, the warning letter and dismissal notice referred to her unilateral cancellation of the event and failure to obtain approval.

Disposition

The court granted the District’s motion for summary judgment on Martinez’s FEHA claims. It denied the motion as to her First Amendment retaliation claim and her derivative wrongful-discharge claim insofar as it was based on First Amendment retaliation. It granted the motion as to the wrongful-discharge claim to the extent it was based on anything other than the First Amendment retaliation allegation. The court vacated the trial and pretrial dates and set a case-management conference for April 15, 2021.